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THE SILENT ALTERNATE JUROR: A VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY?
Johnson P. Duckworth
650 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1981)
The United States Constitution, as originally adopted in 1787,'
guaranteed citizens the right to trial by jury in federal criminal prose-
cutions. 2 Four years later, the sixth amendment was adopted to en-
hance this constitutional right by providing for speedy and public trials
with impartial juries.3 Nevertheless, almost 200 years have elapsed
since the inception of this right to trial by jury and it has yet to be fully
defined. It was not until 1968, 100 years after the ratification of the
fourteenth amendment,4 that this federal right was defined to afford the
citizens of individual states the right to trial by jury in state criminal
prosecutions. 5 Even the most basic components of this right to trial by
jury, such as the constitutionally required number of jurors,6 the una-
nimity of the jury verdict, 7 and the crimes to which this right applies,8
have only recently been defined by the United States Supreme Court.
There are, however, many aspects of this constitutional guarantee
which are still undeveloped and which are the basis of considerable
dispute in state and federal courts today. One such major dispute con-
cerns the jury deliberation process and the proper role of the alternate
juror within that process.
State and federal courts have encountered repeated difficulties in
determining the degree of privacy that should be accorded jury deliber-
1. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3, provides, in part: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases
of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where said Crimes
shall have been committed .
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides, in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed ....
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides, in part: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."
5. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In Duncan, the United States Supreme
Court first held the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by jury applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See also notes 3 & 4 supra.
6. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
7. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
8. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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ations.9 It has been held a "cardinal principle" that the jury delibera-
tion process remain private and secret.' 0 This principle has been
strictly enforced against officers of the court and members of the public
to prevent their intrusion into the privacy of the jury deliberations. I I
However, it is not at all evident that the presence of a silent alternate
juror during any portion of the deliberation process breaches this cardi-
nal rule of privacy, and it is even less clear whether it presents a prob-
lem of constitutional magnitude. 12 In Johnson v. Duckworth,13 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a habeas
corpus proceeding, 14 reviewed an Indiana Supreme Court decision 15
which upheld an Indiana trial court's directive that an alternate juror
observe, but not participate in, the jury deliberations. The defendant
objected to the alternate juror's presence in the jury room, contending
that his constitutional right to trial by jury was impaired because this
procedure resulted in an invasion of the jury's privacy that would stifle
debate and inhibit the deliberation process. 16 The Seventh Circuit held
that, while the procedure approved by the Indiana Supreme Court may
not have been perfect, it was not such an invasion of the privacy of jury
deliberations as to deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to
trial by jury.1 7
9. In addition to the topics discussed in this comment, see 3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-5.7, commentary (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA
STANDARDS]; Comment, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 445 (1971); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 556 (1958) for a
discussion of how much evidence a court is permitted to obtain from a juror concerning the delib-
eration process for the purpose of impeaching the jury's verdict.
10. See United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 872 (4th Cir. 1964).
i1. See, e.g., Rickard v. State, 74 Ind. 275 (1881); People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267, 2 N.W. 927
(1879). See also note 149 infra.
12. See United States v. Meinster, 484 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd in part andrev'din
part on other grounds sub non United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowed
substitution of alternate juror after 1 days of deliberations); United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D.
565 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (allowed substitution of alternate juror eight days after deliberations began in
complex criminal trial); Smith v. State, 241 Ind. 311, 170 N.E.2d 794 (1960) (presence of alternate
juror in deliberations before formal discharge of absent regular juror who was ill was not error).
Cf. State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 220 S.E.2d 521 (1975) (presence of alternate juror in delibera-
tion room for three to four minutes after jury retired to consider its verdict was reversible error).
See also Paisley, The Federal Rule on Alternate Jurors, 51 A.B.A.J. 1044 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Paisley] (suggesting that optimal use of the alternate juror system would permit substitution
before and after deliberations have commenced); Note, Criminal Law. Alternate Jurors: Substitu-
tion After Submission o/Case: Presence During Deliberations of Jury, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 735 (1936)
[hereinafter cited as Alternate Juror Note] (discussing the development, up to 1936, of California's
alternate juror system).
13. 650 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
14. See note 158 infra.
15. Johnson v. State, 267 Ind. 256, 369 N.E.2d 623 (1977), cert. denied sub nor. Johnson v.
Indiana, 436 U.S. 948 (1978).
16. 650 F.2d at 122-23.
17. Id at 126.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
This case comment will analyze the constitutionality of an alter-
nate juror's silent observance of jury deliberations. A brief historical
review will examine the development of state and federal alternate ju-
ror systems within the confines of the traditional belief that the jury
deliberation process be as free from outside influence as possible. An
examination of more recent decisions by state and federal courts will
illustrate the modifications of the alternate juror system and the incon-
sistent interpretations among jurisdictions as to the optimal use of this
system. The facts and the lower court history of Johnson v. Duckworth
will be reviewed and the Seventh Circuit's opinion will be presented.
Additionally, the Duckworth decision will be analyzed on a compara-
tive basis with other jurisdictions and the future implications of the
holding will be discussed. It will be shown that the Seventh Circuit's
approval of Indiana's jury procedures is based upon sound legal rea-
soning and policy considerations; moreover, the constitutional guaran-
tee of trial by jury is not impaired while the efficiency of the jury
system is, in fact, enhanced.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Development of the Alternate Juror System
At common law, the jury was composed of twelve persons.' 8 The
jury system was administered by the individual states, and defendants
in state criminal proceedings acquired jury rights solely through state
statutes and constitutions. 19 While the right to trial by a twelve-mem-
ber jury in federal cases was assured by the federal Constitution,
20
rights relative to state jury trial and procedure were not determined by
federal standards and often contradicted federal practice. 2' Rather
18. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The origin of the twelve-member jury has
been traced to the era of Henry II, King of England from 1139-1189. See generally Thayer, The
Jury and its Development, 5 HARV. L. REV. 295 (1892). However, the fact that the common law
jury was composed of twelve members seems to be largely an historical accident. While various
rationales for this numerical composition have been proposed, there has been no definitive resolu-
tion. 399 U.S. at 97-102. See, e.g., White, Origin and Development of Trial by Jury, 29 TENN. L.
REV. 8, 15-18 (1961).
19. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968);
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875); Note, Ballew v.
Georgia: 4 Move TowardNeo-Incorporationism?, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313, n.3 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as Neo-Incororationism]. Prior to Duncan, jury rights in state criminal prosecutions
depended solely upon state constitutions and statutes. See note 5 supra and notes 102-09 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of Duncan.
20. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158-59 n.30 (1968); Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276, 288-90 (1930); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S.
343, 350 (1898); note 3 supra.
21. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). In Maxwell, a state constitutional provision
providing for an eight-member jury in noncapital offense cases was upheld. The Court was em-
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than clearly defining jury practice and procedure, many states, in their
constitutions, merely preserved the right to trial by jury as it existed at
the time of the adoption of the state constitution. 22 However, difficul-
ties were encountered when the common law was silent in a novel situ-
ation or when its application resulted in inefficiency. 23 Courts and
legislatures thus became involved in the alteration and codification of
common law to meet the needs of a progressing legal system.24
The sanctity of the jury deliberation process became an issue of
judicial concern in the mid-1800s. 25 In People v. Knapp,26 an officer of
the court retired to the deliberation room with the jury and remained
there throughout the deliberation process. The Supreme Court of
Michigan expressed the opinion that the jury retired from the presence
phatic that "States... [be] left to regulate trials in their own courts in their own way." Id at 595.
The states were to have complete control over their court procedures subject to the qualifications
that the procedures could not deny defendants fundamental rights and could not "conflict with
specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution." Id at 605. Thus, the states were
free to implement their own court practices and procedures with respect to jury trials; the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment did not require states to incorporate federal practices. Id at 603-04.
See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 263 P. 226 (1928); People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348,
25 P. 481 (1891); Swart v. Kimball, 43 Mich. 443, 5 N.W. 635 (1880); State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C.
608, 220 S.E.2d 521 (1975); Whitehurst v. Davis, 3 N.C. 110 (1800); Alternate Juror Note, supra
note 12, at 736 n.S. See generally T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 74 (4th ed. 1878).
23. See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). In Patton, the defendants were
charged with a crime that carried a prison sentence. Eight days after the trial commenced, one of
the twelve jurors became ill and was unable to continue. Rather than impanel another jury and
begin the trial anew, see notes 31-33 infra and accompanying text, the government and counsel for
the defendants stipulated in open court that the trial should proceed with the remaining eleven
jurors. After a guilty verdict was rendered by the eleven jurors, the defendants appealed on the
ground that they had no power to waive their constitutional right to a twelve-member jury. 281
U.S. at 286-87. The Supreme Court noted that the federal law required a trial by jury as under-
stood and applied at common law, and one of the necessary elements of a common law jury was
that it "should consist of twelve men, neither more nor less." Id at 288. However, upon review of
several state court decisions allowing waiver of the twelve-member jury requirement, and argu-
ably considering the consequences of requiring new trials in all similar situations, the Court held
that a defendant may waive the right to a twelve-member jury just as he may waive the right to a
jury trial altogether. Id at 290-92. See also notes 33-36 & 50 infra and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); People v. Peete, 54 Cal. App. 333,
202 P. 51 (1921); Alternate Juror Note, supra note 12, at 736. See also State v. Dalton, 206 N.C.
507, 174 S.E. 422 (1934).
25. Luster v. State, 30 Tenn. 118 (1850); Slaughter v. State, 24 Tex. 410 (1859); see Alternate
Juror Note, supra note 12, at 738 nn. 11, 13 & 14 for collection of cases. It was also in this era that
a divergence among states occurred which still exists today. A minority of states held that the
mere presence of an officer of the court in the jury room during any part of the deliberation
process was cause for reversal. Rickard v. State, 74 Ind. 275 (1881); Gandy v. State, 24 Neb. 716,
40 N.W. 302 (1888). The majority rule was that the presence of an officer of the court, or a total
outsider, in the jury room did not constitute reversible error unless there was a showing of
prejudice to the defendant. State v. Beste, 91 Iowa 565, 60 N.W. 112 (1894) (officer of the court
present); State v. Bailey, 32 Kan. 83, 3 P. 769 (1884) (officer of the court present); Thomason v.
Territory, 4 N.M. 150, 13 P. 223 (1887) (outsider present); Commonwealth v. Lombardi, 221 Pa.
31, 70 A. 122 (1908) (outsider present). See notes 67-97 infra and accompanying text.
26. 42 Mich. 267, 3 N.W. 927 (1879).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
of the court solely for the opportunity of private and confidential de-
bate and that the presence of a single other person in the room could
cause such an intrusion upon that privacy that the entire purpose for
retiring to deliberate would be defeated. 27 The Knapp court placed
special emphasis on the fact that the intruder into the jury deliberations
was an officer of the court. It stated that while the jurors had a self-
interest in the preservation of the secrecy of the deliberations, the of-
ficer had no such corresponding interest and that it was through this
avenue that "news-gatherers" and "scandalmongers" could receive and
subsequently disburse information which may not have been otherwise
publicly expressed by the jurors.28 In addition, the court recognized
that knowledge of what the officer might reveal to the public of the
deliberations could curtail uninhibited juror debate. However, the
court also acknowledged that the officer's mere presence might restrain
the jurors' freedom of debate, thereby accomplishing the same result.29
Subsequent court rulings and statutory limitations on the actions of
bailiffs and officers of the court illustrated a general acceptance of the
Michigan Supreme Court's analysis of the need for privacy.30
At the same time that courts were attempting to ensure the privacy
of the jury deliberation process, efforts were also being made to in-
crease the efficiency of the jury system. At common law, there was no
alternate juror system. Consequently, when a juror became ill or inca-
pacitated, the entire jury was discharged, the remaining eleven eligible
jurors were immediately recalled, along with one new member, and the
entire jury was impaneled de novo. 31 After this procedure was com-
pleted, the trial began anew. 32
To avoid repetition of the trial, most states implemented proce-
dures, by statute or by rule of court, for the selection of alternate or
additional jurors. 33 The most common rule calls for an alternate or
substitute juror. In this situation, one or more persons above the re-
quired jury number are chosen and specifically designated as alternates
27. Id at 269-70, 3 N.W. at 929. The Knapp court noted that the opportunity for private
debate was deemed a necessity and was assumed by the court in every case unless the jury ex-
pressly notified the court to the contrary. Id
28. Id at 270-71, 3 N.W. at 930-31.
29. Id at 271, 3 N.W. at 931.
30. See, e.g., Rickard v. State, 74 Ind. 275, 278 (1881). See also note 25 supra and note 149
infira.-
31. When a jury is impaneled de novo, the jury is impaneled "anew" or "a second time."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (5th ed. 1979).
32. See People v. Henderson, 45 Ill. App. 3d 798, 800, 359 N.E.2d 909, 911 (5th Dist. 1977),
afrdsub nom Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1980); see generally Alternate Juror Note,
supra note 12; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 72.
33. See Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1288, 1290 (1962); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 72.
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before the trial begins. If a regular juror is dismissed, the alternate
takes his place. Many states allow substitution only up until the time
the jury retires to deliberate; upon jury retirement, the alternate is dis-
missed.34 In some jurisdictions, substitution is allowed after the jury
retires and prior to the time of first verdict. In most of these jurisdic-
tions the alternate juror is isolated in a separate room until the regular
jury returns a verdict.35
The second system is called the additional or eliminated juror sys-
tem. Under this system, one or more jurors, in addition to the number
of regular jurors required, are selected in advance of trial. If a juror
must be dismissed during trial, it is done without any further action at
that time. If more than the required number of jurors remain when the
jury is to retire, those who shall determine the verdict are selected by
lot.36 Both of these statutes have consistently been held constitutional
by the courts.37 In implementing these alternate juror systems, how-
ever, the states apparently never contemplated the presence of a silent
alternate juror in the deliberation room or whether such a procedure
would be constitutional.38
34. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 234, § 1108(a) (Purdon) (1980).
35. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1089 & 1123 (Deering) (1982); GA. CODE § 59 (1981).
36. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 234, § 26B (West) (1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:74-2
(West) (1976). A preference has sometimes been expressed for the additional or eliminated juror
system on the basis that one designated as an alternate from the outset may not take his jury duty
as seriously as one who realizes that, for example, out of the thirteen or fourteen jurors present,
twelve will be selected and that there is a very high probability that he will be one of those deliber-
ating toward a final verdict. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 72-73. As a general rule, in most
jurisdictions the decision whether to select alternate or additional jurors usually rests in the sole
discretion of the trial judge. However, selection of alternate jurors who are not needed, or the
failure to cause such jurors to be selected with a resulting mistrial, will not result in a challenge of
the judge's exercise of discretion. Id at 73. See, e.g., United States v. Roby, 592 F.2d 406 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979); State v. Heemer, 24 Utah 2d 69, 475 P.2d 1008 (1970).
37. These procedures have been attacked under two main theories. The first theory, the
double jeopardy theory, is premised on the notion that jeopardy attaches at the time the first jury
is sworn to decide the case and allowing one of the regular jurors to be replaced with an alternate
is tantamount to swearing in a new jury, thus placing the defendant in double jeopardy because
there is a second trial for the same offense by the same sovereign. See, e.g., Dirring v. United
States, 370 F.2d 862, 864 (1st Cir. 1967); State v. Bircher, 573 P.2d 1128, 1129-30 (Kan. App.
1978); State v. Sallee, 8 Ohio App. 2d 9, 11, 220 N.E.2d 370, 371-72 (1966). The second theory,
that the alternate juror system violates the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, consists of the
idea that, because there has been a substitution or replacement, the defendant is no longer being
tried by the statutorily required number ofjurors but by a jury consisting of more members than
the statute mandates. This argument has been rejected, largely on the ground that, at any given
time, there are no greater or less members of the deliberating jury than the statute requires. There
is only a different juror who has been subject to the same voir dire process and who has heard the
same evidence as the replaced juror. See, e.g., People v. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d 100, 101-05, 278
N.Y.S.2d 199, 201-03, 224 N.E.2d 710, 711-13 (1966). Both of these theories have consistently
been rejected by the courts. See Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1288, 1292-98 & 1309-10 (1962).
38. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 75.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Silent Alternate Juror in State Courts
In 1935, the issue of the alternate juror silently observing jury de-
liberations was first faced by a state supreme court. In People v. Brit-
ton,39  the California Supreme Court held that the procedure
constituted reversible error because it violated a California statute that
required that the alternate juror be kept in the custody of the sheriff
during deliberations, and because it breached the strict privacy the
court felt should be afforded the jury deliberation process. 4° A similar
result was reached by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Common-
wealth v. Krick.41 In Krick, the court found reversible error when two
alternates were permitted to retire with the jury but were withdrawn
ten minutes later when counsel for the defendant objected to their pres-
ence in the jury room. A Pennsylvania statute provided that alternate
jurors were not to participate in the jury deliberations and the court
held that to even allow them an opportunity for such participation was
in direct violation of the provision. 42 In Glenn v. State,43 reversible er-
ror was found where the trial court permitted an alternate juror to ob-
serve, but not participate in, the deliberations. This procedure was in
direct contravention of a Georgia statute that specifically prohibited the
alternate from retiring with the jury; thus, the court considered reversal
mandatory.44 Similar decisions rendered on the "silent observance" is-
sue in other jurisdictions also relied on state statutes and constitutions
regulating the dismissal of alternates and providing for trial to a jury
composed only of an exact number of jurors as a basis for reversal.
45
39. 4 Cal. 2d 622, 52 P.2d 217 (1935).
40. Id at 622-23, 52 P.2d at 217. In Britton, the California Supreme Court adopted the
holding of People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal. App. 2d 75, 40 P.2d 891 (1935). In both cases, it was held
reversible error when the trial court permitted alternate jurors to sit in on the jury deliberations,
even though the alternates had been instructed that they were to take no part in the proceedings
and there was no evidence that the presence of the alternates in any way influenced the verdict. In
Bruneman, defendant's counsel had even assented to the procedure. Both decisions were based on
section 1089 of the California Penal Code, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1089 (Deering) (1937), which had
been amended in 1933 to provide for the discharge of alternates when the regular jurors were
dismissed, and which was construed as allowing substitution of an alternate for a regular juror
after the jury had retired to deliberate. People v. VonBadenthal, 8 Cal. App. 2d 404, 48 P.2d 82
(1935). The court reasoned that the legislature had not intended and, in fact, had not authorized
the court to allow alternate jurors to observe the deliberations; thus, notwithstanding the fact that
there was no evidence of any influence on the regular jurors by the presence of the alternates,
there was an invasion of the defendant's right to trial by jury. The court further concluded that
this invasion was so destructive that it could not be rendered harmless by consent and thus rever-
sal was required. 4 Cal. App. 2d at 79, 40 P.2d at 893.
41. 164 Pa. Super. Ct. 516, 67 A.2d 746 (1949).
42. Id
43. 217 Ga. 553, 123 S.E.2d 896 (1962).
44. Id
45. See, e.g., Brigman v. State, 350 P.2d 321 (Okla. Crim. 1960). In Brigman, an alternate
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Thus, through the formative years of the alternate juror system,
the prevailing view among the states was that the presence of an alter-
nate juror in the jury room during deliberations violated jury privacy,
even though the alternate juror took no part in the debate, 46 his pres-
ence was consented to,47 and there was no evidence that the alternate in
any way influenced the deliberating jury.4 8 However, in federal courts
the alternate juror's role has been subject to a variety of interpretations,
notwithstanding a federal rule of procedure that purports to define the
alternate's specific role.
The Alternate Juror System in the Federal Courts
In United States v. Virginia Erection Corp. 49 a federal court was
first presented with the issue of the silent alternate juror observing the
jury deliberation process. This case also provided the federal court sys-
tem with its first opportunity to apply the new Federal Rules of Crimi-
juror retired with the regular jurors and took part in the first ballot before he was discovered and
dismissed. Even though the first ballot was more favorable to the defendant than any of the
succeeding ballots, the appellate court held that the defendant's fundamental rights had been vio-
lated when thirteen jurors had participated in the deliberations. The Oklahoma Constitution had
been interpreted to allow an accused to waive the right to trial by jury and to even agree to be
tried by a lesser number than twelve, see generally note 50 infra, but the court held that this in no
way provided for a jury of more than twelve and reversed the conviction with an order for a new
trial. 350 P.2d at 323. Cf. People v. French, 12 Cal. 2d 720, 87 P.2d 1014 (1939), overruled on other
grounds, People v. Valentine, 28 Cal. 2d 121, 169 P.2d 1 (1946) (contention of reversible error was
rejected where jury was to deliberate in courtroom and alternates had been present in courtroom
only a few minutes with the regular jury while the room was being put in order); Smith v. State,
241 Ind. 311, 170 N.E.2d 794 (1960) (fact that regular juror had taken ill and was removed to her
home and the alternate was placed in jury deliberations, before formal discharge of regular juror
by the court, was held to be mere irregularity and not cause for reversal where, upon defendant's
counsel's objection, alternate was removed, a hearing was conducted by the court and the ill juror
was properly discharged before the alternate was allowed to participate further in the
deliberations).
46. See People v. Britton, 4 Cal. 2d 622, 52 P.2d 217 (1935); People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal. App.
2d 75, 40 P.2d 891 (1935); note 40 supra for a discussion of the Bruneman and Britton cases.
47. See People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal. App. 2d 75, 40 P.2d 891 (1935).
48. See notes 40 & 46-47 supra and accompanying text. The alternate juror role has been less
harshly construed when the alternate juror is not a party to the actual deliberation process. See
People v. Cox, 174 Cal. App. 2d 30, 344 P.2d 399 (1959) (court rejected argument that allowing
alternate juror to sit with regular jurors during dinner was tantamount to permitting an unautho-
rized person to be present during deliberations); Ruffin v. State, 50 Del. 83, 123 A.2d 461 (1956)
(no constitutional violation was found where alternate jurors were permitted to mingle with regu-
lar jurors, both in and out of the jury room, prior to submission of the case to the regular jury, in
the absence of any showing of improper conduct by alternates). Accord, Commonwealth v. Cole-
man, 179 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 115 A.2d 811, aff'd, 383 Pa. 474, 119 A.2d 261 (1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 938 (1955). Cf. People v. Cocco, 305 N.Y. 282, 113 N.E.2d 422 (1953) (contact between juror
and former alternate held to require reversal when the discharged alternate made disparaging
statements about the defendant's character to the regular juror, even though the juror said the
statements did not influence her in the deliberations and she had not revealed the information to
any of the other jurors).
49. 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir, 1964).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
nal Procedure to such a jury practice.50 Rule 23 of the federal rules
allows a defendant to waive a jury trial altogether or to waive a twelve-
member jury and be tried by a jury of a lesser number. 5' Rule 24(c)
defines the alternate juror procedure: "An alternate juror who does not
replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to con-
sider its verdict."' 52 In Virginia Erection, the district court permitted the
50. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were promulgated and adopted by the United
States Supreme Court subsequent to Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). See United
States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964). Patton is an interesting illustration
of the Supreme Court's willingness to re-examine its prior declarations regarding the nature of
jury trials in almost every aspect but the twelve-man jury requirement. See note 23 supra for a
discussion of the facts in Patton. Because at common law the jury consisted of twelve persons, see
note 18 supra, most states provided for twelve-member juries and the prevailing belief was that the
framers of the Constitution intended to preserve this right. See Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969
Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 165-66 (1970) (the author suggests that the lack of debate surrounding
the adoption of the sixth amendment indicates an intent to preserve the common law jury with its
twelve-member tradition): Neo-Incorporationism, note 19 supra. Patton reaffirmed the require-
ment of twelve-member juries in federal courts while implementing the novel assertion that the
requirement could be waived. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92 n.31 (1970). It was de-
cided in Patton that trial to a jury could be waived by a defendant and, if this right could be
waived, the defendant might similarly relinquish his right to a constitutionally composed (twelve-
member)jury and submit to ajury of a lesser number. However, before any such waiver would be
considered effective, sanction of the court and consent of government counsel must have been
received, in addition to the "express" and "intelligent" consent of the defendant. 281 U.S. at 312.
See also United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 870 (4th Cir. 1964). Relying on
the Patton decision, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were enacted. The rules, having the
force and effect of law, are binding on district judges conducting criminal trials in the federal
court system. Id at 870; Navarro v. United States, 400 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1968).
51. Rule 23 provides:
(a) Trial by Jury. Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defend-
ant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the
government.
(b) Jury ofLess than Twelve. Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the
parties may stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist
of any number less than 12 or that a valid verdict may be returned by a jury of less than
12 should the court find it necessary to excuse one or more jurors for any just cause after
trial commences.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23.
52. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c). Rule 24(c), as initially promulgated, provided, in relevant part:
(c) Alternate Jurors. The court may direct that not more than 4 jurors in addition to the
regular jury be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the
order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires
to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate
jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be
subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have
the same functions, powers, facilities and privileges as the regular jurors. An alternate
who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider
its verdict.
Id In 1966, rule 24(c) wasamended to provide for not more than six alternate jurors based on the
experience that four alternates were often inadequate in lengthy criminal trials. See, e.g., United
States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1961). In addition, the words "or are found to be" were
added to the second sentence, which now reads: "Alternate jurors in the order in which they are
called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become or
are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties." FED. R. ClM. P. 24 (Advisory
Committee's Note-1966) (emphasis added). This modification was included to make it clear that
an alternate could replace a regular juror when it was discovered for the first time during trial that
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
alternate juror to attend, but not participate in, the jury deliberations
pending determination of the ability of one of the regular jurors to pro-
ceed due to possible ill health.53 The district court record indicated
that counsel for both the government and the defendants had agreed to
this procedure, but there was nothing in the record to indicate the de-
fendants'personal consent. 54 In reversing and remanding the case for a
new trial, 5" the Fourth Circuit adopted a very strict construction of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.56 The court held that the de-
fendants could stipulate to a trial with less than twelve jurors but noth-
ing in rule 23(b) provided for a jury with more than twelve members.
57
In addition, since the court found nothing in the record to indicate that
the defendants had personally consented,5 8 the court considered rever-
sal mandatory. 59 Rule 24(c) was also meticulously construed in its re-
quirement that the alternate be dismissed after the jury retires to
deliberate. 60 Since this procedure hid also not been complied with, the
court found an additional basis for ordering reversal.
61
the regular juror had been unable or disqualified at the time he was sworn to be a jury member.
Id See United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
53. 335 F.2d at 869. The district court was concerned about a mistrial because a previous
trial of defendants had resulted in a mistrial and the second trial had already been in progress
several days. Id at 869 n.2.
54. Id at 870 n.3.
55. Id at 873.
56. See notes 51 & 52 supra.
57. 335 F.2d at 871. See note 51 supra.
58. 335 F.2d at 870-71. See note 51 supra for a discussion of the Patton requirement that the
court receive the "express" and "intelligent" consent of the defendant before stipulation to a jury
composed of less than twelve members will be upheld. The district court apparently equated the
Patton criteria with this situation, even though the procedure violated the mandates of the crimi-
nal rules and was not similar to the fact situation presented in Patton.
59. 335 F.2d at 870 n.3. Even if the defendants had consented to the alternate's presence in
the jury deliberations, it is doubtful that the Fourth Circuit, under the strict construction adopted
by it, would have allowed the trial to stand because there is no provision in rule 23(b) allowing a
defendant to consent to an alternate's presence during deliberations. The only modification that a
defendant may consent to, under rule 23(b), is a lesser-numbered jury.
60. Id at 871-72. See note 52 supra. Considering the history leading to the adoption of rule
24(c), the court noted that a procedure had been considered which would have permitted substitu-
tion after the deliberations had commenced. The provision was rejected after the constitutionality
and desirability of such a procedure were questioned by the Supreme Court. Id at 871. See
Orfield, Trial Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 46 (1962). Cf. Paisley, supra note 12,
at 1044 (the author suggests that substitution after deliberations have commenced would be an
improvement of the existing alternate juror system).
61. 335 F.2d at 873. The circuit court noted other irregularities which could have had an
impact on their decision to reverse. The first uncertainty dealt with the trial court's instructions to
the alternate and ill jurors. It was apparently unclear from the record who was to determine
when, and if, the regular juror should be replaced. It was questioned whether this strictly judicial
function, though clearly recognized as such by the parties, had been improperly delegated to the
alternate and ill jurors. The second possible ground for reversal involved the neutrality of the
apparently ill juror, Miss Furr. In accord with local custom, the jury had been allowed to question
the witnesses and Miss Furr asked two questions that the trial judge felt seemed to favor the
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In contrast to the strict precedent set by Virginia Erection, the Sec-
ond and Ninth Circuits immediately felt compelled to make exceptions
to the mandates of the rules. In Leser v. United States,62 the Ninth
Circuit allowed substitution of an alternate juror for an ill regular juror
after several hours of deliberations. 63 Counsel for the government and
the defendants had stipulated to the trial procedure in open court in the
presence of the defendants, who expressed no objection to the proce-
dure.64 However, on appeal, the defendants' only contention was that
they had not specifically assented. 65 The Ninth Circuit, affirming the
lower court's conviction, held that by not objecting to the procedure in
the trial court, the defendants "knowingly and intelligently acquiesced
in the voluntary stipulation of their counsel." 66
In United States v. Hayutin,67 the Second Circuit carefully extri-
cated itself from the literal mandates of rule 24(c) and introduced a
new element to the federal alternate juror rule. In Hayutin, three alter-
nate jurors were retained after the jury retired to deliberate but they
were isolated in a separate room. 68 The trial judge refused the defend-
defense; in fact, one of the questions seemed not to be a question at all but more of an argument
that could have been made by the defense. The nature of the questions, in addition to statements
made by Miss Furr to the clerk and the court reporter, raised the issue of whether Miss Furr was
prejudiced against the government and the trial judge conducted a hearing in an attempt to deter-
mine any such prejudice. However, the Fourth Circuit found that such an interrogation may have
operated as a restraint upon Miss Furr's ability to function as a juror. Id at 871-73. Even though
these irregularities were present, it is apparent that at least one of the principal grounds for rever-
sal was the presence of the alternate juror in the jury room during the deliberations in contraven-
tion of rules 23(b) and 24(c).
62. 358 F.2d 313 (9th Cir.), cert. dismirsed, 385 U.S. 802 (1966),petition to vacate denied, 390
F.2d 634 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 953 (1968).
63. Id at 318.
64. Id at 315.
65. Id at 315-16. The court noted that the defendants did "not contend that they did not
comprehend the stipulation which was certainly intelligible to any person of ordinary understand-
ing." Id at 317.
66. Id The Ninth Circuit apparently found that the right to stipulate to such a substitution
after deliberations had begun was permitted by the Patton decision, and the court evidently con-
cluded that the failure to object with knowledge of the procedure was equivalent to the Patton
criteria of "express" and "intelligent" consent by the defendant. See notes 23, 50 & 58 supra. The
court then interpreted Virginia Erection as holding that rules 23(b) and 24(c) are violated when
there are more than twelve jurors present and distinguished Leser on the grounds that there were
only twelve jurors at all times. 358 F.2d at 318. The court, though obviously aware of the state-
ment in Virginia Erection explaining the reason for the exclusion of the provision allowing substi-
tution after deliberations had begun, see note 60 supra, apparently felt that its situation called for
compromise in view of the fact that the trial had taken seven weeks and produced more than 4,000
pages of trial transcript. 358 F.2d at 313. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that rules 23(b) and 24(c)
could be waived by the defendants' attorneys, as long as the defendants knew that their attorneys
were waiving the mandates of the rules and made no objection in court, even though the rules of
procedure provide for no such waiver. Id at 318.
67. 398 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968), subsequent appeal sub norm
United States v. Nash, 414 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969).
68. Id at 950.
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ants' requests to discharge the alternates and the defendants contended
on appeal that this refusal was error.69 The Second Circuit made a
number of statements about rule 24(c), all indicating that a literal inter-
pretation was preferable;70 it then proceeded to depart from the rule.
7'
The court held that, since the defendants had not been prejudiced by
the sequestration of the alternates, a reversal was unnecessary, even
though the procedure violated rule 24(c). 72 Nonetheless, the Second
Circuit did seem to indicate that, aside from the specific fact situation
presented, it could be expected to follow Virginia Erection's strict inter-
pretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
73
In light of the Leser and Hayutin deviations from the strict prece-
dent established in Virginia Erection, it became apparent that an ac-
ceptable interpretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was
still being sought in the circuit courts. The Tenth Circuit apparently
sanctioned the strict construction of the rules set by the Fourth Circuit
in Virginia Erection, while the Fourth Circuit itself began to express
dismay about the stringent precedent it had established. United States
v. Beasley74 and United States v. Chatman75 presented similar fact situ-
ations to the Tenth and Fourth Circuits. In both cases, an alternate
juror accidentally retired to the deliberation room with the regular ju-
rors. In Beasley, the Tenth Circuit considered two possible options:
Virginia Erection's "per se reversible error" rule76 and Hayutin's "re-
versible error if prejudice to the defendant is found" rule. 77 The Tenth
69. Id
70. Id The court expressly stated that "[tihe absence of benefit being so clear and the danger
of prejudice so great, it seems foolhardy to depart from the command of Rule 24." Id
71. Id at 950-51.
72. Id It is arguable that the prejudice element was considered because of the early deci-
sions of some courts holding that the presence of officers of the court or outsiders did not mandate
reversal unless prejudice to the defendant was shown as a result of the invasion of the deliberation
process. See note 25 supra.
73. 398 F.2d at 950-51. The Second Circuit, while upholding the district court's conviction
because there was no showing of prejudice to the defendants, expressed some confusion as to the
reason the alternates had been retained. Counsel for the government explained that the procedure
presented counsel with the option of stipulating to substitution of an alternate after deliberations
had begun in the event a regular juror became ill or unable to continue. The Second Circuit
expressed the opinion that this reason was "no reason in the absence of any rule or statute autho-
rizing such consent." Id at 950. Compare notes 58 & 66 supra with note 73. See note 277 infra
and accompanying text.
74. 464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972).
75. 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978).
76. 464 F.2d at 469. The rule is called the "per se reversible error rule" because, once the
Virginia Erection court determined that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure had been vio-
lated, it considered reversal mandatory, if not automatic. See United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d
1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 471 (5th Cir.), a f'd, 487 F.2d
339 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974).
77. 464 F.2d at 469-70. See notes 67-73 supra and accompanying text.
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Circuit adopted strict compliance with rule 24(c). 78 In Chatman, how-
ever, the Fourth Circuit was of the opinion that there was only one
option available to it as a result of the strict precedent it had estab-
lished in Virginia Erection.79 The court noted that the case against the
defendant was strong, his defense was frivolous and the appeal had
little merit, other than the accidental presence of the alternate juror in
the deliberation room for the first 45 minutes of the deliberations.
80
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit, albeit reluctantly, 81 ordered reversal
because Virginia Erection required that result.
8 2
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, appears to have blatantly
rejected the strict standard established in Virginia Erection while adopt-
ing the prejudice test enunciated in Hayutin. In United States v. Al-
lison,83 the only issue on appeal to the circuit court was the presence of
the alternate juror in the jury room for the first portion of the delibera-
tions.84 In the district court, at the conclusion of a three-week trial, it
was brought to the attention of the trial judge that one of the regular
jurors had been ill the night before the deliberations were to com-
mence. The regular juror's ability to continue was uncertain 85 and the
78. 464 F.2d at 469-70. The Beasley court found itself in a compromising situation because
the alternate had not only retired with the regular jury but she had voted to select a foreman and
to go to lunch. Unlike the situation in Virginia Erection, the jury had consisted of thirteen partici-
pating members before the alternate was discovered and dismissed. Id at 469. The Tenth Circuit,
though considering the option presented by Hayutin's prejudice test, concluded that a showing of
the alternate's participation or non-participation in the deliberations did not provide an appropri-
ate standard of the "prejudice" test. In addition, the court felt that a hearing to inquire of such
participation was, in itself, a "dangerous intrusion into the proceedings of the jury." Id at 470.
79. See notes 55-61 supra and accompanying text.
80. 584 F.2d at 1361. The circuit court, noting that the alternate was dismissed with no evi-
dentiary inquiry to determine whether she had participated in the deliberations or not, intimated
that such a hearing may have had an impact on its decision. Nevertheless, the fact that there was
neither an objection to the alternate's presence in the trial court, nor a motion for a mistrial, was
not sufficient to sustain the lower court's conviction as the Fourth Circuit interpreted Virginia
Erection to require neither. Id at 1361-62.
81. Id at 1361. The court stated:
Reluctantly (because we think that the case against defendant was so strong and his
defense so frivolous), we think that we must notice the presence of the alternate in the
jury room during part of the jury's deliberations as plain error, reverse the convictions
and award defendant a new trial. [Virginia Erection] requires this result.
Id
82. Id
83. 481 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 416 U.S. 982
(1974).
84. Id at 469.
85. Id at 460-70. At this point the court presented the counsel for the government and the
defense with three options. The first was to retain the alternate separate from the jury just in case
he was needed; the trial judge expressed the opinion that this was probably the best procedure.
The second option, the one ultimately chosen at the urging of defense counsel, was to allow the
alternate to accompany the regular jury into deliberations with instructions that he was not to
participate unless the regular juror was dismissed by the court. The final option was that all the
lawyers could stipulate to proceed with only eleven jurors should the ill juror be unable to con-
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defense counsel insisted that the best procedure would be to send the
alternate to the jury room with the regular twelve jurors. This proce-
dure was carefully explained in open court and the jurors were in-
structed that the alternate was in no way to participate in any portion
of the deliberation process unless the regular juror was dismissed.
8 6
The jury deliberated for one and a half hours and after lunch it became
apparent that the regular juror would be able to finish the proceed-
ings.87 The alternate juror was immediately discharged, the jury re-
turned to the jury room and, after three more hours of deliberations,
returned a verdict of guilty. 88 The objection to this procedure was
raised for the first time on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, where the de-
fendants contended that their sixth amendment right to trial by jury
had been violated because they did not personally assent to the proce-
dure. 89 Because at no time during the deliberations were there more
than twelve participating jurors, the Fifth Circuit refused to rule on the
constitutional arguments of the defendants 90 and further dismissed the
contention that the procedure violated Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 23(b). 91 In distinguishing Virginia Erection, the court noted that
there "a new trial was necessitated by a combination of procedural ir-
regularities which are not present in the instant case." 92 Further, the
court distinguished Beasley on the basis of consent. 93 In Beasley, the
alternate juror accidentally retired with the regular jury and partici-
pated in two votes; in Allison the defendants consented to and, in fact,
requested the presence of the silent alternate juror.94 The Fifth Circuit
tinue. Counsel for the government suggested that the trial judge dismiss the ill regular juror and
substitute the alternate before deliberations began. The trial judge, however, did not believe that
the regular juror's condition was sufficient justification for dismissal at that time. Id
86. Id at 470.
87. Id
88. Id
89. Id See note 3 supra for the relevant text of the sixth amendment. It should be noted that
defense counsel in the circuit court was not the same defense counsel that urged that the alternate
juror be allowed to silently observe the jury deliberations in the district court. See 481 F.2d at
470.
90. 481 F.2d at 470. The defendants argued that their sixth amendment guarantee had been
violated because they were powerless to consent to a jury in excess of twelve, even though the
procedure was approved and, in fact, requested by their attorneys. The Fifth Circuit refused to
rule on this argument because, in the court's view, "the defendants were not tried by a jury of
thirteen, but rather by a jury composed of twelve members with an alternate observing a portion
of the deliberations." Id
91. Id As a consequence of their determination that the jury was composed of only twelve
members, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the charge of violation of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 23(b) was moot. Id See note 51 supra for the text of rule 23.
92. 481 F.2d at 471. See note 61 supra.
93. 481 F.2d at 471. See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text.
94. 481 F.2d at 471. The court did note, however, that faced with factual circumstances simi-
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nevertheless felt that the possibility of prejudice should be considered.
The court concluded that sufficient prejudice would be shown if the
alternate had in any way participated in the deliberation process or if
any regular juror had been inhibited in any manner by the presence of
the non-participating alternate juror.95 In remanding the case with di-
rections for a limited evidentiary hearing,96 the Fifth Circuit expressed
no major objection to the presence of a "mute" alternate during the
deliberations.
97
Other federal court interpretations of rules 23(b) and 24(c) have
likewise produced anomolous results, illustrating a general dissatisfac-
tion in the federal courts with the principles enunciated in these rules.98
In general, however, while the constitutionality of alternate juror pro-
cedures that deviate from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has
been raised as an issue in the federal courts, the courts have consist-
ently avoided reaching the constitutional question. 99 Since the consti-
lar to those of Virginia Erection and Beasley, it too might be persuaded to conclude a mistrial was
necessary. Id
95. Id at 472. Cf. United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972) (concluding that
the participation or non-participation of the alternate juror in the deliberation process was not an
appropriate standard for the prejudice test and that a hearing to determine whether or not there
had been participation was a dangerous intrusion in itself). See note 78 Supra.
96. 481 F.2d at 473. The evidentiary hearing was restricted to determinations of: (I) whether
the alternate participated in any way; (2) whether he took part in any vote; (3) whether he indi-
cated his view regarding any of the defendants, orally or otherwise; and (4) whether his mere
presence inhibited any regular juror in any aspect of the deliberation process. Id at 472. The
hearing revealed no prejudice to the defendant by the presence of the silent alternate juror and
when the hearing results were certified, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its original decision. United
States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468 (th Cir.), afrd, 487 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), cer. denied, 416 U.S.
982 (1974).
97. 481 F.2d at 472. The Fifth Circuit had previously decided a civil case with an almost
identical fact pattern as that presented in Allison. In La-Tex Supply Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Div.,
Fruehauf Corp., 444 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971), an alternate juror was
permitted to retire with the regular jury and was cautioned not to participate unless ordered to do
so by the court. Despite the admonition, the alternate juror, at one point in the deliberations,
stated, "'Let's listen to the foreman.'" Id at 1367. The Fifth Circuit, on appeal, refused to
reverse the district court's decision, finding that the procedure had been explained to and agreed
upon by all parties before the alternate entered the jury room. The court further stated that
"[dlespite earnest efforts to inflate it into more serious proportions, we think that the innocuous
nature of the remark speaks for itself." Id
98. See, e.g., Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1980) (recalling an alternate juror
who had been dismissed and sent home and substituting him for a regular juror after 2 hours of
deliberations was not error); United States v. Meinster, 484 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'din
part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub non United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.
1981) (allowed substitution of alternate juror after 1I days of deliberations); United States v.
Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (allowed substitution of alternate juror after eight days of
deliberations in a six-month, complex criminal trial); c United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153
(9th Cir. 1975) (unique procedural posture of substitution of an alternate juror, over the defend-
ant's objection, after the jury had reached a verdict that was rejected by the trial judge as inconsis-
tent with the jury instructions, was found to require reversal in that the mandates of rule 24(c) had
not been complied with).
99. See, e.g., Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 181 (1979); United States v.
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tutionality of the alternate juror system itself has repeatedly withstood
constitutional attack, 100 the federal courts are apparently of the opinion
that deviations from the federal rules can best be analyzed by focusing
upon the correct interpretation of those rules.' 0 '
Independence of Federal and State Jury Procedure
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court, in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana,10 2 announced that the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by
jury10 3 was applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.'04 The Court did not, however, decide that
state jury procedure must conform to federal practice. 0 5 In fact, the
Court did not even contemplate widespread revision of state criminal
procedures.l0 6 It simply imposed upon the states the requirement that
the defendant be afforded a trial by jury in serious criminal proceed-
ings. 1 7 Consequently, states made juries available to defendants who
were accused of serious crimes, but they continued to interpret jury
Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir.), afl'd, 487 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982
(1974); United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975).
100. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
101. The United States Supreme Court has exhibited support for the proposition that devia-
tions from the mandates of the rules should be analyzed by focusing on the correct interpretation
of the rule itself. See Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964) (stating that the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure "are not, and were not intended to be, a rigid code to have an inflexible
meaning irrespective of the circumstances"). Id at 142.
102. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
103. See note 3 supra for the relevant text of the sixth amendment.
104. See note 4 supra for the relevant text of the fourteenth amendment.
105. Justice Fortas, concurring, made it plain that he did not think such a result should follow
merely from the fact that states would be required to afford defendants jury trials.
There is no reason whatever for us to conclude that. . . we are bound slavishly to follow
not only the Sixth Amendment but all of its bag and baggage, however securely or inse-
curely affixed they may be by law and precedent to federal proceedings.
Jury trial is more than a principle of justice applicable to individual cases. It is a system
of administration of the business of the State. While we may believe. . . that the right
of jury trial is fundamental, it does not follow that the particulars of according that right
must be uniform. We should be ready to welcome state variations which do not im-
pair-indeed which may advance--the theory and purpose of trial by jury.
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 213-15 (Fortas, J., concurring in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968)). (Justice Fortas' concurring opinion in Duncan also applied to Bloom.)
106. 391 U.S. 145, 158 n.30 (1968). The overwhelming majority of states already provided for
jury trials that were "equal in breadth" to the sixth amendment. Id at 159.
107. Id at 161-62. The Duncan Court held that a trial had to be afforded defendants who
were accused of serious crimes but did not define "serious crime." The Court in Duncan only held
that a defendant who faced a possible incarceration of up to two years was accused of a "serious
crime" and was, therefore, constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. Id Subsequently, in Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970), the Court defined a "serious crime" as one that carries a
maximum penalty exceeding six months' imprisonment. See generally Neo-Incorporationism, note
19 supra.
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procedures according to their own statutes and constitutions. 08 The
Duncan decision, nevertheless, opened an inevitable floodgate of litiga-
tion. By expressly reserving the question of whether state and federal
jury procedure must be consistent, t°9 the Supreme Court invited fed-
eral court scrutiny of all state jury procedures that deviated from fed-
eral jury practice.
The first state jury procedural issue to reach the federal courts con-
cerned the numerical composition of the jury. In Williams v. Florida, "10
the Florida statute at issue provided for twelve-member juries in all
capital cases and six-member juries in all other criminal cases." '
Before the Florida trial court, the defendant, charged with robbery,
filed a pre-trial motion to impanel a twelve-member jury instead of the
six-member jury provided in all cases other than capital cases." 12 The
motion was denied and the defendant was convicted and sentenced to
life imprisonment by a six-member jury."3 The defendant appealed on
the ground that his sixth amendment rights had been violated and the
Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.' "4 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' ,5 and upheld the con-
stitutionality of a six-member jury in a state criminal proceeding.1
6
After concluding that the common-law requirement of a twelve-mem-
ber jury was an historical accident," 7 the Court reasoned that a six-
member jury was as capable of performing the jury's function as the
traditional twelve-member jury." 18 The purpose of a trial by jury was
stated as the prevention of government oppression" 9 and, given this
purpose, the essential feature of the jury was defined as "the interposi-
tion between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judg-
ment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and
shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of
108. See, e.g., Hearns v. State, 223 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970)
(Florida provision for six-member jury was held constitutional because, although the sixth amend-
ment guarantees the right to trial by jury, it does not specify a required number of jurors). See
also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
109. 391 U.S. 157-58 & n.30.
110. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Ill. Id at 79-80 & n.3.
112. Id at 80 & n.3.
113. Id at 80.
114. Id The Florida Supreme Court determined that it was without jurisdiction to entertain a
direct appeal from the Florida trial court; thus, the District Court of Appeals was the highest court
from which a decision could be had. Id at 80 n.5.
115. 396 U.S. 955 (1969).
116. 399 U.S. at 103.
117. Id at 102.
118. Id. at 100.
119. Id
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guilt or innocence."' 120 The Court concluded that this purpose was not
a function of the number of jurors12 1 and held the purpose served when
the jury was large enough to promote group deliberation without exter-
nal influence and when the size provided the possibility of obtaining a
representative cross-section of the community. 22 Thus, while the
Court never expressly declared that state jury procedures need not con-
form to federal practice, 123 such an inference is permissible because of
the twelve-member jury requirement in federal courts.
The constitutionality of less-than-unanimous jury verdicts in state
courts was the next procedural dispute subjected to federal court scru-
tiny. In Apodaca v. Oregon,124 an Oregon constitutional provision per-
mitting less-than-unanimous jury verdicts was at issue. 25 In federal
jury trials, unanimity of verdicts had been recognized as an indispens-
able feature since the late 1800s.126 Thus, the contention on appeal to
the United States Supreme Court was, essentially, that the defendants
were denied their constitutional right to trial by jury under the sixth
amendment because the Oregon Constitution did not guarantee the
same rights as the federal Constitution. 27 Justice Powell, concurring,
noted that, although, on the basis of history and precedent, the sixth
amendment requires unanimity in federal jury trials, 28 the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment does not impose upon the states all
the elements of a jury trial within the meaning of the sixth amend-
120. Id
121. Id
122. Id See note 108 supra.
123. The Court concluded its decision with the following statement: "Our holding does no
more than leave these considerations to Congress and the States, unrestrained by an interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment that would forever dictate the precise number that can constitute a jury."
399 U.S. at 103; see notes 21 & 51-52 supra and accompanying text. The constitutionality of a jury
with less than six members remained dubious until Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). In
Ballew, the Court rendered unconstitutional the use of five-member juries in state criminal pro-
ceedings. Although the Court did not reach a majority decision, the Justices all agreed that a jury
of five was constitutionally insufficient. Id at 245-46. Justice Powell argued that the Ballew deci-
sion should not be interpreted as requiring state and federal jury practice to be identical and that
the approval of six-member state juries did not imply that federal juries would be similarly com-
posed. Id See generally Neo-Incorporationism, supra note 19.
124. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
125. ORE. CONST. art. I, § 11 provides, in part: "[11n the circuit court ten members of the
[twelve-member] jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a verdict of
guilty of first degree murder, which shall be found only by a unanimous [twelve-member jury]
verdict, and not otherwise. .. "
126. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1948); Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288-90 (1930); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900); Thompson
v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 355 (1898). See also FED. R. CiAM. P. 31.
127. 406 U.S. at 406.
128. Id at 369-70 (Powell, J., concurring) (Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Apodaca is
printed in Johnson). See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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ment. 29 In addition to approving the precedent first expressed in Wil-
liams,130 of allowing individual states to regulate their own jury
procedure even if contradictory to federal practice, the Supreme Court,
by its holding in Apodaca, clarified the definition of the purpose of a
jury trial: The purpose of a trial by jury' 31 is not vitiated when a unan-
imous verdict cannot be returned by the jury; as long as a majority
verdict is rendered in accordance with the state statute or constitution,
a defendant has been afforded his constitutional right to trial by jury.132
Thus, even though the Supreme Court has never expressly stated that
state and federal jury practice need not be in conformity, the holdings
of Williams and Apodaca illustrate a resolution by the Court that such
conformity is not required and, indeed, is not expected.
That such consistency between state and federal jury practice is
neither required nor expected is further illustrated by Potter v. Per-
ini.133 In 1976, the Potter case presented a federal court with its first
opportunity to review a state court decision which, in effect, allowed an
alternate juror to silently participate in the jury deliberation process.
In Potter, an Ohio trial judge neglected to dismiss the alternate juror,
who then retired to the jury room with the jury for forty-five minutes of
the deliberations. When this oversight was discovered, the jury was
called into court and a hearing was conducted; the alternate juror was
instructed not to discuss the deliberations or how she would have voted
and was then discharged.' 34 The jury subsequently deliberated one
hour, returned to the court for additional instructions and later re-
turned a unanimous guilty verdict. 35 Potter's appeal to the Ohio
Supreme Court was dismissed on the ground that it presented no sub-
129. 406 U.S. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell was emphatic in his belief that the
fourteenth amendment did not require state and federal jury practices to be uniform: "I do not
think that all of the elements of jury trials within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment are neces-
sarily embodied in or incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
. .. . [Due process does not require that the States apply the federal jury-trial right with all its
gloss." Id See also notes 3 & 4 supra for relevant text of the sixth and fourteenth amendments,
respectively.
130. See notes 110-23 supra and accompanying text.
131. See notes 119-22 supra and accompanying text.
132. 406 U.S. at 373-74 (Powell, J., concurring). Even though states may constitutionally em-
ploy six-member juries, see note 125 supra, it was determined in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130
(1979), that states are constitutionally bound to require unanimity ofjury verdicts in six-member
jury trials.
133. 545 F.2d 1048 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
134. Id at 1049. Apparently the district court hearing revealed that there was no participation
by the alternate in the deliberations, that her presence had no effect on the other jurors and that
her presence had not prejudiced the defendant in any way. Id See note 141 infra.
135. 545 F.2d at 1049.
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stantial constitutional question. 136 The defendant then petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus to the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Ohio.' 37 The district court granted the petition and held
that the presence of an alternate juror in the jury deliberations for any
length of time created sufficient grounds for mistrial. 38 The district
court judge ordered that Potter be released from custody unless a new
trial was granted. 39 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, the district court's order was reversed. 40 The
Sixth Circuit was succinct in its reversal: "Federal courts do not exer-
cise supervisory jurisdiction over state trial courts"; the Ohio decision
was "grounded upon a procedural issue not related in any manner to
the Federal Constitution."'
4'
In essence, the Sixth Circuit in Potter upheld the precedent set by
the Supreme Court in Williams and Apodaca. The individual states,
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, are re-
quired to afford defendants in serious state criminal proceedings the
right to trial by jury. However, the holdings of the Supreme Court
indicate that state jury procedure should be controlled by the state and
need not conform to federal jury practice. It was against this back-
ground of uncertainty as to the exact role of the alternate juror in the
jury deliberation process, and the apparent autonomy granted states in
the regulation of jury trial procedure, that the Seventh Circuit faced the
issue of the constitutionality of the silent alternate's presence in the de-
liberation room in Johnson v. Duckworth.1
42
136. Id. at 1048.
137. Potter appealed his conviction on the grounds that his constitutional rights had been
violated by the presence of the alternate juror in the jury room during the deliberations. Id at
1049. See note 158 infra.
138. 545 F.2d at 1050.
139. Id at 1048. The district court judge relied on United States v. Virginia Erection Corp.,
335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964) and United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972) in over-
ruling the Ohio Supreme Court. See notes 49-61 & 74-78 supra and note 141 infra and accompa-
nying text.
140. 545 F.2d at 1050.
141. Id The court of appeals found that there was no showing of any participation by the
alternate, or that the presence of the alternate prejudiced the defendant in any way or had any
influence on the deliberations of the jury. The court did state that one of the elements negating
any prejudicial influence was the continued deliberations of the jury after discharge of the alter-
nate. Id at 1049. The Sixth Circuit emphasized that the district judge's reliance on Virginia Erec-
ion and Beasley was misplaced because both of those decisions had been subject to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and those rules had no application in state trial courts in the absence
of state adoption. It was also pointed out that Ohio courts had reached similar conclusions in
other cases under their state constitution. Id at 1050. Accord Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175
(7th Cir. 1980).
142. 650 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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JOHNSON V. DUCKWORTH
Facts of the Case and Procedure in the Courts
The defendant, Robert A. Johnson, was charged with first degree
murder. In the Criminal Court of Marion County, Indiana, the trial
judge instructed the alternate juror to go with the jury to the jury room
and to listen to the deliberations. However, the alternate was admon-
ished that he was not to participate unless ordered to do so by the
court.' 43 The defendant's objection to the trial judge's directive to the
alternate juror was overruled and the alternate remained in the jury
room for the duration of the deliberations. 44 The defendant did not
request an examination of the jurors subsequent to verdict in order to
determine any possible prejudice or improper influence. 45 The jury
returned a conviction of murder in the second degree and no hearing to
determine any improper influence was conducted.
14 6
On appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court,1 47 Johnson contended
that the trial court erred in allowing the alternate juror to retire with
the regular jury over his objection to such a procedure. 48 The Indiana
143. Johnson v. State, 267 Ind. 256, 257-58, 261, 369 N.E.2d 623, 624-25 (1977), cert. deniedsub
non. Johnson v. Indiana, 436 U.S. 948 (1978). The trial court's instructions to the jury included
the following statement to the alternate:
Alternate juror, Harold Lett, you will retire with the jury. But unless, and until, we
excuse a juror and you are directed to actively serve, you are not to vote or participate in
the deliberations. You should, however, listen, so that should you be called upon to
serve, you will have the benefit of the preceding discussions.
Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 123 n.I (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
144. 267 Ind. at 261, 369 N.E.2d at 626.
145. If the defendant had requested an examination of the jurors subsequent to verdict, it is
arguable that the Indiana trial court would have allowed the jurors and the alternate to be ques-
tioned to determine whether the alternate had participated in any way or whether his mere pres-
ence had inhibited or influenced the jury debate in any manner. See, e.g., Gann v. State, 263 Ind.
297, 330 N.E.2d 88 (1975); Frasier v. State, 262 Ind. 59, 312 N.E.2d 77, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1092
(1974); Sparks v. State, 154 Ind. App. 691, 290 N.E.2d 793 (1972). See also note 298 infra and
accompanying text. If such participation or influence had been discovered, the defendant could
then argue that he had been prejudiced by the alternate's presence in the jury deliberations and
thus, that his constitutional right to trial by the statutorily required number of impartial jurors
could have been violated. See, e.g., United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 961 (1968), subsequent appealsub nom. Nash v. United States, 414 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969).
146. 267 Ind. at 257-58, 261, 369 N.E.2d at 624, 626.
147. Johnson v. State, 267 Ind. 256, 369 N.E.2d 623 (1977), cert. deniedsub nom. Johnson v.
Indiana, 436 U.S. 948 (1978).
148. Id at 257, 369 N.E.2d at 624. Johnson raised three other issues on appeal to the Indiana
Supreme Court. The first issue alleged hearsay and improper certification of the coroner's report
of the death of the decedent. The second ground of appeal contended that a mistrial should have
been declared when the jury observed the defendant in handcuffs. The final allegation of error
was that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The Indiana Supreme Court de-
clared all three allegations as lacking in merit in affirming the jury's second degree murder convic-
tion. Id at 258-60, 369 N.E.2d at 624-25.
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Supreme Court noted that the Indiana Code forbade communication
by the jury with any person unless by order of the court. 149 However,
the court found that an alternate was in every respect a juror' 50 and
concluded that, as long as the alternate did not in any way participate
in the deliberations or communicate with the regular jurors, he should
not be considered as a stranger to the jury or an outsider who should
not be permitted to silently observe the jury deliberation process.' 51
Accordingly, the court held that the alternate juror may, in the discre-
tion of the trial court, properly retire to the jury room to listen to the
deliberations, provided the trial judge clearly instructs the alternate
that he is not in any way to participate in the deliberations unless one
of the regular jurors is dismissed by the court.' 52 Finding that such an
instruction was in fact tendered by the trial court judge, the Indiana
Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction.
53
In a well-reasoned dissent,' 54 Justice Pivarnik deemed the possibil-
ity of prejudice to the defendant so great that there was no way it could
be cured other than by outright reversal.155 The dissenting justice was
troubled by the lack of discussion in the majority opinion as to the
possibility of prejudice. 56 He further argued that even if the majority
149. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-37-4 (Burns) (1976) provides:
After hearing the charge, the jury may either decide in court or retire for delibera-
tion. They may retire under the charge of an officer, who must be sworn by the clerk to
keep them together in some private and convenient place, and furnish them food as
directed by the court, and not permit any person to speak or communicate with them,
not do so himself unless by order of the court, or to ask them whether they have agreed
upon their verdict, and return them into court, when so agreed, or when ordered by the
court. The officer shall not communicate to any person the state of their deliberations;
and if he does he shall be punished as for a contempt, and shall not be further employed
as a bailiff in such court.
If there are unauthorized communications with the jury by any person, including a silent alternate
sitting in on the deliberation process, and prejudice to the defendant can be found therefrom, it is
arguable that the court may order that a new trial should be conducted. See, e.g., Gann v. State,
263 Ind. 297, 330 N.E.2d 88 (1975); Sparks v. State, 154 Ind. App. 691, 290 N.E.2d 793 (1972).
150. The court cited Turczi v. State, 261 Ind. 273, 301 N.E.2d 752 (1973), for the proposition
that an alternate is in every respect a juror. 267 Ind. at 260, 369 N.E.2d at 625. In Turczi, the
Indiana Supreme Court defined a juror as a "person who is sworn or affirmed to serve on a jury"
and concluded that an alternate is such a person. 261 Ind. at 275, 301 N.E.2d at 753. Turczi,
however, appears to stand for the proposition that because an alternate juror has taken the same
oath as the regular jurors and performed all the functions of regular jurors, except the final defib-
erations, that an alternate, like a regular juror, may not impeach the jury verdict. Id
151. 267 Ind. at 260, 369 N.E.2d at 625.
152. Id
153. Id See note 143 supra.
154. 267 Ind. at 260, 369 N.E.2d at 625 (Pivarnik, J., dissenting; Hunter, J., concurring with
the dissent as to the alternate juror issue only).
155. Id at 264-65, 369 N.E.2d at 628 (Pivamik, J., dissenting).
156. "I am aware of no authority which has simply held, as does the majority in this case, that
the presence of an alternate in the jury room was proper and without the possibility of prejudice."
Id at 264, 369 N.E.2d at 627 (Pivarnik, J., dissenting).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
would consent to a hearing to determine any possible prejudice, such a
hearing would be impractical, inadequate, against public policy and, in
and of itself, an invasion of the privacy and confidentiality of the jury
deliberation process.1
57
Upon the Indiana Supreme Court's refusal to declare a mistrial,
defendant brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus 58 in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, claiming vio-
lation of his constitutional right to trial by jury under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments. The district court dismissed the petition and
Johnson appealed.
The Seventh Circuit's Holding
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Johnson's petition for writ of habeas corpus. 159 The
Seventh Circuit initially made the crucial distinction that it is the right
to trial by jury that the Constitution guarantees, not the right to jury
privacy.16° Jury privacy is merely a means to reach the constitutional
end of trial by jury and, within limits, is one proper mode of maintain-
ing the integrity of jury trials. 16 1 Accordingly, the court focused on the
interrelation between the alternate juror system and the purposes of a
jury trial 162 to determine whether the privacy of the jury deliberations
was so essential to the "substance of the jury trial guarantee"'' 63 that an
error of constitutional dimension had been committed by allowing the
alternate to silently observe such deliberations. 164 The privacy of the
157. Id at 260, 369 N.E.2d at 68 (Pivarnik, J., dissenting).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976) provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge or a district court shall enter-
tain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the jud~ment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
Johnson contended that his constitutional rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments had
been violated by the alternate's presence in the jury room during the deliberations. 650 F.2d at
123. In addition, Johnson had exhausted his state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)
(1976). 650 F.2d at 123 n.2.
159. Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
160. Id at 125 n.7.
161. Id at 125. The court stated that, in fact, jury privacy must be breached in certain circum-
stances in order to protect the defendant's constitutional right to trial by jury. For instance, the
privacy of the jury must be invaded where there is evidence that a juror's vote was "predicated
upon a bribe rather than upon a conscientious evaluation of the evidence." Id at 125 (citing
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1933)).
162. See notes 119-22 supra and accompanying text.
163. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979). See note 132 supra.
164. 650 F.2d at 124. The Seventh Circuit examined a brief history of jury system composi-
tion mandated by the United States Supreme Court. It acknowledged the right to trial by jury in
serious criminal proceedings, that such rights did not constitutionally demand a twelve-member
jury, and that the unanimous verdict of a twelve-member jury was not required if a state statute or
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jury deliberation process was not found to be such a substantive com-
ponent of the right to trial by jury that the silent observance of an alter-
nate juror, who possessed all the requisite qualifications of a regular
juror, deprived the defendant of this constitutional right.
65
The Seventh Circuit noted Johnson's reliance on such cases as
United States v. Virginia Erection Corp. ,166 United States v. Beasley,
167
and United States v. Chatman, 68 where the federal courts held the
presence of an alternate juror during deliberations to constitute per
se 169 reversible error.170 The court noted that the primary basis for
these decisions was Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), which
requires dismissal of the alternate jurors when the jury retires to delib-
erate. 17' However, the federal rules are not binding upon the states in
the absence of state adoption 72 and Indiana has not adopted the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit
did consider dicta in these opinions to the effect that the alternate's
presence "might" have affected the verdict and may have breached the
privacy of the jury room deliberations. 73 Although acquiescing in the
need for privacy and secrecy of the jury deliberations in order to pro-
mote uninhibited debate and independence of thought, 174 the Seventh
Circuit distinguished the alternate juror from other outsiders who may
be seen as hampering such freedom of expression.' 75 In rejecting de-
fendant's reliance on People v. Knapp,176 the court held that, unlike the
situation presented in Knapp where an officer of the court was pres-
ent, 177 the invasion of the jury deliberation process here was not by one
constitution called for only a majority verdict. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The court of
appeals also acquiesced in the constitutional mandate of a jury comprised of at least six members
and the requirement of a unanimous verdict from juries so composed. See Burch v. Louisiana,
441 U.S. 130 (1979); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1973). The Seventh Circuit determined that
these Supreme Court decisions were based on the fundamental right to trial by jury and the sub-
stantive components of that right. The Seventh Circuit then examined the issue of the silent alter-
nate's presence in the deliberation room within the same context. 650 F.2d at 125.
165. 650 F.2d at 126.
166. 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964); see notes 49-61 supra and accompanying text.
167. 464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972); see notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text.
168. 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978); see notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text.
169. See note 76 supra.
170. 650 F.2d at 124.
171. Id See note 52 supra.
172. See, e.g., Potter v. Perini, 545 F.2d 1048 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). See notes 133-41
supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Potter.
173. 650 F.2d at 124.
174. Id (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933)).
175. 650 F.2d at 125.
176. 42 Mich. 267, 3 N.W. 927 (1879).
177. See notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text.
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who may have had ulterior motives or who may have been prejudiced
or biased toward one of the parties. 178 In the present case, the alternate
had gone through all of the formalities necessarily required of a regular
juror and there was no reason to expect that he would favor conviction
any more than he would favor acquittal.
79
Finally, the Seventh Circuit found the policy considerations un-
derlying Indiana's requirement of the alternate's presence at the jury
deliberations to be of special significance. 80 The court noted that the
role of the alternate juror was to replace a regular juror who became ill
or incapacitated. While this role was indubitably served if substitution
was required before retirement, it was questionable whether the same
procedure would be as effective if substitution was required after the
deliberations had commenced because the alternate would be com-
pletely ignorant of prior discussions if he had been barred from listen-
ing to the deliberations.' 81 The solution by the Indiana trial court
obviated this dilemma because the alternate would be in the jury room
and thus would be fully apprised of all arguments made prior to substi-
tution.1 82 In addition to the remedial nature of the procedure, the court
found the practical effects as outweighing any of the alternative proce-
dures typically employed by the courts.' 83 The court focused on the
three alternatives commonly used. The first option would retain the
alternate "on call" so that, should a deliberating juror become unable
to complete the process, the alternate could then be substituted. How-
178. 650 F.2d at 125 (citing People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267, 268-69, 3 N.W. 927, 929-30
(1879)).
179. 650 F.2d at 125. The alternate juror had been subject to the same voir dire examination
in which he affirmed, under oath, that he had no prejudices or biases toward either party. The
alternate had been subject to peremptory challenge and, when not eliminated by this procedure,
had been exposed to exactly the same case that the regular jurors had been exposed to. The
alternate, as part of the jury hearing the trial, had been instructed to disregard improper testi-
mony; offers of proof and arguments as to admissibility of evidence had been submitted outside
the presence of both regular and alternate jurors. If the regular jury had been sequestered, the
alternate would have been sequestered along with the regular jurors. The attorneys' closing argu-
ments and the instructions on the law are given to regular and alternate jurors alike. Thus, the
alternate who accompanies the jury into deliberations is no more biased or prejudiced than any
regular juror and has no more information from which to draw on to arrive at a verdict than that
possessed by the regular jurors. Id The Seventh Circuit did disagree with the Indiana Supreme
Court's determination that the alternate was not a stranger to the jury and therefore did not in-
vade the jury's privacy. Id at 125 n.7. The Seventh Circuit noted that the very fact that the
alternate was not allowed to participate and vote made him a stranger to the jury deliberations.
Nonetheless, the court focused upon the "particular encroachment" of the jury's privacy and
found that, because of the identical treatment of alternate and regular jurors, this encroachment
was not one that deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to trial by jury. Id at 125.
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ever, in order for the alternate to be fully apprised of the prior discus-
sions, the remaining jurors would either have to capsulize the prior
debate or begin deliberations anew with the substituted alternate.
8 4
The problem with this procedure was that the alternate's vote could
easily be influenced if the remaining jurors had already arrived at a
verdict and there was the risk that his vote may be based on a less-than-
thorough examination and discussion of the evidence. 8 5 The second
procedure would simply permit the remaining jurors to decide the case.
The court noted, however, that the constitutionality of this option could
not be definitely ascertained where a jury had only six members to be-
gin with.'8 6 In addition, the court stated a preference for compliance
with a legislatively determined jury size. ' 8 7 The final alternative would
be to declare a mistrial. Focusing on the defendant, the court ex-
plained the devastating effect of such a result on a defendant who may
have depleted his resources to pay his retained attorney. The defend-
ant consequently may be forced to repeat the entire proceeding with a
court-appointed attorney unfamiliar with the case.' 88 In conclusion,
the Seventh Circuit found that, although the Indiana procedure may
not have been perfect, it was preferable to the alternatives and, in any
event, could not be held to have deprived Johnson of his constitutional
right to trial by jury. 8 9
Analysis of the Opinion
In upholding the Indiana Supreme Court's decision, the Seventh
Circuit complied with the United States Supreme Court decisions
which allowed individual states to adopt jury procedures in accordance
with their respective needs, even though these procedures might not
comport with federal court procedures. 19° In Duncan v. Louisiana,191
the Supreme Court decided that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment incorporates the right to trial by jury guarantee of
the sixth amendment and thus is applicable to the individual states.
92
However, the Court did not decide whether state jury procedure must
184. Id
185. Id
186. Id at 126 & n.10. See note 123 supra and notes 273-79 infra and accompanying text.
187. Id at 126.
188. Id
189. Id
190. See generally notes 102-42 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the indepen-
dence of federal and state jury procedure.
191. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
192. Id at 149.
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conform to federal jury practice.' 93 That issue was decided by the
Court in Williams v. Florida,194 and upheld in Apodaca v. Oregon,19
when the Court gave its constitutional "seal of approval" to state jury
procedures that were inconsistent with jury procedures in the federal
system. 196
Justice Powell, in Ballew v. Georgia,t97 and Justice Fortas, in
Duncan v. Louisiana,198 made it clear that state and federal jury prac-
tice are not required to be identical and that states should be allowed
the greatest latitude in developing jury variations, as long as they do
not impair the theory or purpose of the jury trial within the meaning of
the federal Constitution. 99 The fact that many states already assume
this autonomy as to jury procedural issues is illustrated by the number
of jurisdictions relying on only their own laws and decisions for their
determination of the consequences of an alternate's presence in the jury
room during deliberations.2°° Thus, the Seventh Circuit carried out the
stated preferences of the Supreme Court by its initial determination
that Indiana was free to implement its own jury procedural rules.
20 1
193. Id at 158 n.30.
194. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). See notes 110-23 supra and accompanying text.
195. 406 U.S. 404 (1972). See notes 124-32 supra and accompanying text.
196. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407-11, 414 (1971). That the Supreme Court has
shown a favorable inclination toward allowing states to employ jury procedures which are not
sanctioned in the federal system is also illustrated in Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618
(1976). In Ludwig, the Court held that the use of a two-tiered trial system by a state was constitu-
tional, even though such a procedure was not allowed in the federal court system. Id at 629-30.
The Court stated that "It]he modes of exercising federal constitutional rights have traditionally
been left, within limits, to state specification." Id at 630. See also Duncan v. Tennessee, 405 U.S.
127 (1972) (per curiam) (establishing different double jeopardy standards in federal and state
courts); Potter v. Perini, 545 F.2d 1048 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). Contra, Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (when the United States Supreme Court held the sixth amendment right
to trial by jury applicable to the states, the affirmative duty to provide a cross-representative jury
venire, previously required only in the federal courts, also became applicable to the states). See
generally Cord, Neo-Incorporation: The Burger Court and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 215 (1975); Comment, Due Process and Jury Trials in State
Courts, 10 ARIz. L. REv. 492 (1968).
197. 435 U.S. 223, 245-46 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
198. 391 U.S. 145, 211-16 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).
199. See notes 105, 119-22, 123 & 129 supra and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Potter v. Perini, 545 F.2d 1048 (6th Cir. 1976) (the Sixth Circuit, dismissing the
defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, relied on Ohio law only in holding that where the
presence of the alternate juror caused no prejudice to the defendant, no reversal was required);
Bullock v. State, 150 Ga. App. 824, 258 S.E.2d 610 (1979) (Georgia Supreme Court cited only
Georgia case law for holding reversible error where an alternate juror was allowed to retire with
the regular jury over the defendant's objection); Vander Veer v. Toyota Motor Distrib., Inc., 282
Or. 135, 577 P.2d 1343 (1978) (relying only on an Oregon statute requiring dismissal of the alter-
nate when the jury retires to deliberate, the Oregon Supreme Court found reversible error when
two alternates accompanied regular jurors to the jury room and voted on the issue of liability in a
civil case). See also Johnson v. State, 267 Ind. 256, 369 N.E.2d 623 (1977), cert. deniedsub nom.
Johnson v. Indiana, 436 U.S. 948 (1978).
201. The Seventh Circuit was required to determine, at the outset, that Indiana was free to
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The question remaining to be answered was whether the Indiana pro-
cedure in any way deprived Johnson of his right, under the United
States Constitution, to trial by jury.
The Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury vs. the Right to Jury Privacy
In examining the constitutionality of the alternate's silent obser-
vance of the jury deliberation process, the Seventh Circuit distin-
guished the right to trial by jury from the right to jury privacy. 20 2 The
right to trial by jury, being the constitutional end to be protected, is
absolute and cannot be taken away or infringed upon by the individual
states. Thus, in all serious criminal prosecutions, states must afford de-
fendants a trial by jury as provided in the Constitution and defined by
the United States Supreme Court.
20 3
Jury privacy, on the other hand, is neither guaranteed by the Con-
stitution nor granted by the United States Supreme Court. It is, how-
ever, one means of ensuring the integrity of the jury trial.2°4 Thus, jury
privacy is not absolute but may be modified by a state in order to pro-
mote the efficiency and effectiveness of the protected right for the bene-
fit of the defendant, the prosecution, the defense and the general
public.205 Nevertheless, modifications of jury privacy by a state must
still be circumscribed to ensure that the purpose of the jury trial is not
impaired 20 6 and that the jury's ability to deliberate is not interfered
with.207 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit examined United States
Supreme Court decisions ruling on issues of jury procedure20 8 and
devise its own jury procedural rules. The lack of discussion by the Seventh Circuit as to the ability
of Indiana to implement this procedure indicates the federal court's willingness to defer to state
jury procedural autonomy. If such a determination had not been implicitly made, the arguable
result would have been the prompt invalidation of the Indiana procedure as contrary to Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(b) and 24(c), see notes 51-52 supra, because, if states were not free
to implement their own jury procedures, they would, under the fourteenth amendment, be bound
by the federal rules.
202. 650 F.2d at 125 n.7. "[T]he constitutional right at stake is the jury trial, not jury privacy."
Id
203. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also notes 2, 3 & 4 supra.
204. See generally Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
205. See note 161 supra.
206. See notes 119-22 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the purpose of a jury
trial. See generally.Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972).
207. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978).
208. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978);
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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adopted the criteria used by the Court in such cases 2°9 to determine the
constitutionality of the procedure utilized in Indiana. 210 These crite-
ria 211 are based on the fundamental right to trial by jury and the sub-
stantive components of that right. 212 The Seventh Circuit defined jury
privacy as a "substantive component" of the right to trial by jury and
thus perceived the relevant inquiry to be whether the alternate's pres-
ence was such an intrusion upon that privacy component that it im-




In determining that the jury's ability to function had not been im-
paired, the Seventh Circuit examined the type of invasion that had oc-
curred in the Indiana trial court: An alternate juror had been
permitted to retire with the regular jury to the jury room to participate
silently in the deliberation process. 214 The court stated that this type of
invasion did not pose the same threat that the presence of any other
outsider to the jury deliberations would pose. 215 The alternate juror
had been through the same voir dire process and had been exposed to
the same evidence as the regular jurors; thus, there was no basis upon
which to conclude that he was not as open-minded or neutral as the
regular jurors or would inhibit the jury's ability to debate. 216 In fact, in
contrast to other outsiders or officers of the court, with whom the jury
has no, or at most, limited contact, 217 it is probable that the regular jury
is even comfortable with the alternate juror. The alternate has been
with the regular jury for the duration of the trial; they have eaten to-
gether, have probably made small conversation and gotten to know one
another, and, if sequestered, have been sequestered together.218 Thus,
209. The relevant criteria, as propounded by the Supreme Court, involved determinations
such as whether the feature at issue presented a "threat to the preservation of the substance of the
jury trial guarantee," Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979); whether the procedure im-
paired, to a constitutional degree, the jury's ability to function; whether the procedure defeated
those axioms critical to the preservation of liberty; and whether it was fundamentally fair to allow
such a procedure. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
210. 650 F.2d at 124.
211. See note 209 supra and accompanying text.
212. See generally the cases cited in notes 208-09 supra.
213. 650 F.2d at 125.
214. Id
215. See generally notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
216. See note 179 supra and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267, 3 N.W. 927 (1879).
218. In fact, in those states that employ the additional or eliminated juror system, the juror
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this particular encroachment should not be viewed as one which the
jury would feel inhibited by or uncomfortable with since they are fa-
miliar with the alternate and are accustomed to his presence.
In determining that the mere presence of the alternate juror did
not result in a constitutionally impermissible invasion of jury privacy, it
is interesting to note that the Seventh Circuit did not consider the
often-raised issue that the facial expressions and gestures of the alter-
nate might have such a profound impact upon the deliberating jury
that they would be inhibited or influenced by such physical manifesta-
tions.21 9 Perhaps this omission was from the honest belief that these
physical gestures could not truly have so profoundly affected the jury
that their ability to deliberate would have been hampered. On the
other hand, reference to these gestures may have been omitted so as not
to imply serious question of the jury's integrity. One of the basic prem-
ises upon which our entire system of trial by jury functions is the "rule"
that juries can be trusted to comply with the trial judge's instruc-
tions.220 If the alternate juror had been instructed not to participate, it
is arguable that the Seventh Circuit, due to the absence of any evidence
illustrating such participation, simply assumed that the jurors all com-
plied with this instruction. Even though these reasons are viable expla-
nations for the lack of discussion of this oft-mentioned issue, perhaps
the main reason was that the defendant simply did not request a hear-
ing to determine whether such incidents actudlly occurred.22t In the
absence of a request to determine whether prejudice actually occurred,
the court will normally only presume prejudice if there is evidence of
juror misconduct.222 Since no evidence was presented upon which to
ultimately chosen as the alternate has, until the conclusion of the trial and just prior to the deliber-
ations, been one of the actual jurors. See notes 33-36 & 179 supra and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.), a6'd, 487 F.2d 339 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974).
220. See Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 75 n.7 (1979). See also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)). In concurring
in Apodaca, Justice Powell noted that our "historic dedication to jury trial" is based upon the
conviction that "each juror will faithfully perform his assigned duty." Id at 379. See generally
United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1975) (Wright, J., and Trask, J., dissenting).
221. While this issue appears to have been raised in the Indiana Supreme Court, Johnson v.
State, 267 Ind. 256, 261, 369 N.E.2d 623, 626 (1977), cert. deniedsub norn. Johnson v. Indiana, 436
U.S. 948 (1978) (Pivarnik, J., dissenting), there is no indication in the Seventh Circuit's opinion
that the defendant made this argument on appeal in the federal cour4. See Johnson v. Duck-
worth, 650 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). In any event, the difendant did not request a
hearing to determine any possible prejudice and, thus, could not argue on appeal that he had been
prejudiced by the silent alternate's presence. See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text; see
also note 300 infra.
222. See Bowman v. State, 207 Ind. 358, 192 N.E. 755 (1934); Hutchins v. State, 151 Ind. 667,
52 N.E. 403 (1898). See generally Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
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base a finding of juror misconduct, or participation by the alternate, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that there was nothing inherent in this par-
ticular type of invasion that would have influenced the jury or inhibited
its ability to debate.
223
In determining that the jury's ability to function had in no way
been impaired by the silent presence of the alternate juror, the Seventh
Circuit appeared to be departing dramatically from the traditional be-
lief in the absolute privacy of the deliberation process. 224 However, at
common law, there was no alternate juror system; 225 thus, any invasion
of the jury's privacy necessarily constituted an invasion by an "out-
sider" because no one else had been with the jury throughout the entire
trial proceedings or had been subjected to the same selection process.
22 6
Accordingly, by the time the alternate juror system was conceived, the
element of absolute privacy was deeply imbedded in the theory of trial
by jury.2 2 7 Furthermore, this theory of strict privacy was arguably ap-
plied to the alternate juror system automatically, without much thought
being given to the fact that the alternate was not the typical outsider
that the rule had been devised to protect against. In fact, the American
Bar Association notes that the procedure of allowing an alternate to
silently observe jury deliberations is often rejected simply because the
legislatures did not contemplate such use of alternate jurors when stat-
utes regulating their conduct were enacted.228 Nevertheless, the histori-
cal prevalence of a procedure should not prevent states from
modernizing that procedure to enhance its practicality and efficiency. 229
.4 Sound Public Policy
It is in defending Indiana's attempts to modernize the alternate
juror system and to increase the system's efficiency that the Seventh
223. 650 F.2d at 125.
224. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964); Rickard
v. State, 74 Ind. 275 (1881); People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267, 3 N.W. 927 (1879). See also notes 25-
30 & 49-61 supra and accompanying text.
225. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
226. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text. See generally Alternate Juror Note, supra
note 12, at 738.
227. See generally notes 25 & 38-45 supra and accompanying text.
228. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 2.6 at 75.
229. See, e.g., Paisley, supra note 12, at 1044. See also Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F.
Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind. 1979). In Hines, the court emphasized that both federal and state courts
have expressly held that reasonable changes in procedure surrounding the right to trial by jury are
constitutionally permissible and that, except as forbidden by constitutional provision, states have
the power to change the rules of common law, no matter how deeply they may be imbedded. Id
at 427 (citing Manley v. State, 196 Ind. 529, 149 N.E. 51 (1925)).
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Circuit's most compelling arguments are found.230 Since its inception,
the purpose of the alternate juror system has been to provide a substi-
tute, should one of the regular jurors become ill or incapacitated, so as
to prevent the multitude of mistrials experienced at common law.
23
1
The system, as it presently exists in the majority of states, and in the
federal system, is, nevertheless, inadequate to accomplish the intended
purpose because there are only two types of substitution typically al-
lowed. 232 The first type permits substitution only before the delibera-
tions process begins. By allowing only this type of substitution, the
federal system and the states are, in effect, defeating the entire purpose
of the alternate juror system. If, after having gone through the entire
trial and having commenced deliberations, one of the deliberating ju-
rors becomes ill or unable to continue, and the defendant refuses to
stipulate to the remaining jurors rendering a verdict, 233 a mistrial must
be declared.
234
Recognizing this inefficient result, some states have adopted the
second type of substitution procedure whereby the alternate jurors are
retained but isolated from the deliberating jurors. Under this proce-
dure, if a deliberating juror becomes ill or unable to continue, an alter-
nate would still be present who could join the deliberations if the
defendant refused to consent to a lesser-numbered jury.2 3 5 This sys-
tem, however, is not without fault either.
In United States v. Lamb, 236 the Ninth Circuit, construing Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), raised some very strong policy argu-
ments against allowing substitution of an isolated juror after delibera-
tions have begun. First, the coercive effect upon an alternate who has
not had the benefit of prior debate could be substantial if the remaining
jurors have already decided on a verdict. Second, if a regular juror
230. 650 F.2d at 126.
231. See generally notes 23 & 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
232. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
233. See note 50 supra and notes 272-79 infra and accompanying text.
234. The insufficiency of this type of substitution has been clearly recognized by state and
federal courts as well as by commentators. See, e.g., Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175 (7th Cir.
1980); United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978); Potter v. Perini, 545 F.2d 1048
(6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.), af§'d, 487 F.2d 339 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974); United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968), subsequent appeal sub norm. Nash v. United States, 414 F.2d 234 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969); Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d 313 (9th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 385 U.S. 802 (1966); United States v. Meinster, 484 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aft'din
part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub norm. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. Fla. 1979); People v. Valles, 24 Cal. 3d 121, 15
Cal. Rptr. 543, 593 P.2d 240 (1979); Paisley, supra note 12, at 1044.
235. See notes 40 & 62-72 supra and accompanying text.
236. 529 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1975).
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could not condone the vote of the other jurors, this juror might be
under personal or emotional pressure to feign illness so that the alter-
nate would then be placed in the position of making the choice.2 37 Fur-
thermore, if the alternate juror were substituted after any length of
deliberations, the other jurors would have to summarize the foregoing
debate or begin deliberations anew, resulting in the distinct risk that
the alternate would be voting upon a less-than-thorough examination
of the case.
238
While it may be argued that allowing the alternate juror to silently
observe the deliberation process would not eliminate these detrimental
effects, that is not always the case and there are advantages presented
by this procedure that are absent from the "isolation until substitution"
procedure. For example, the possibility that the alternate would be
voting on a less-than-thorough examination of the case is eliminated.
The alternate's silent presence for the duration of the deliberation pro-
cess ensures that he has been fully apprised of all aspects of the case as
discussed by the regular jurors and that his vote, should he be substi-
tuted, will be based on a complete analysis of those discussions. One
might argue that the requirement that jurors begin deliberations anew,
if an alternate is substituted after deliberations have commenced,
would accomplish the same result. 239 However, there remains the pos-
sibility that not all previous discussions would be remembered and
raised and, even if raised, the remaining regular jurors may feel a very
cursory discussion is sufficient to fully apprise the "new" juror. In con-
trast, the silent alternate, by his mere presence, has absorbed all prior
discussions and, if required to replace a regular juror, will be able to
fully and intelligently discuss all previous deliberations in addition to
raising items that the remaining jury may feel are unimportant or have
already been decided. Furthermore, the coercive effect on the substi-
tuted juror if the regular jurors have already decided on a verdict could
237. Id. at 1156. In such a situation, the defendant may be deprived of an opportunity for a
hung-jury mistrial if a unanimous verdict is required in that particular jurisdiction. Id.
238. Id. See Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 126 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). See also
Orfield, Trial Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43 (1962). In fact, this very procedure
was declared unconstitutional in the State of New York. See People v. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d 100, 278
N.Y.S.2d 199, 224 N.E.2d 710 (1966). However, New York has subsequently provided that substi-
tution after deliberations have commenced will be allowed where the defendant specifically con-
sents in writing to such substitution. See N.Y. CR.IM. PROC. LAW § 270.35 (1 IA McKinney)
(Supp. 1981).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Meinster, 484 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aj?'d in part and
rey'd in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. Fla. 1979); People v. Valles, 24 Cal. 3d 121, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 543, 593 P.2d 240 (1979); People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742
(1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1977).
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be less ominous if the alternate were allowed to at least hear the previ-
ous debate. While a substituted juror who has not had the benefit of
prior discussions would be ignorant of all the reasons for the estab-
lished verdict, the observant alternate is knowledgeable of every one of
these reasons. In anticipation of possible substitution, the silent alter-
nate could conceivably formulate arguments for or against the decided
verdict and, if substituted, may even suggest new ways of examining
evidence and information that were perhaps overlooked by the previ-
ously deliberating jury. Finally, the concern that a regular juror who
could not condone the verdict might feign illness to be excused from
the stressful situation raises the question of whether such a juror should
be allowed to deliberate and vote at all. If such a juror is unable to
emotionally detach him or herself from the situation in order to objec-
tively determine the innocence or guilt of the defendant based upon the
law and the trial judge's instructions, perhaps the best possible proce-
dure is to remove that juror from the process and to allow the fully
apprised alternate to take his or her place.
24°
An Evolutionary Trend Toward the Silent Alternate Juror Procedure
From the previous discussion, it has become apparent that al-
lowing an alternate juror to silently participate in the deliberation pro-
cess is not unconstitutional and, in fact, is perhaps the best possible
means of ensuring a jury trial with the legislatively preferred number of
jurors. In considering why this procedure has not been met with over-
whelming approval, it must be remembered that "lawyers and judges
are prone to look askance at proposals for procedural changes and to
resist innovations," 24' particularly when there is proposed tampering
with such constitutional safeguards as the right to trial by jury.
242
However, even this admitted resistance to change cannot overlook the
evolutionary trend toward adoption of this very procedure. The devel-
opment of the alternate juror system in California is particularly illus-
trative of this trend.
Prior to 1935, substitution of alternate jurors in California was au-
thorized only in the event of death or illness of a regular juror and
then, only before final submission of the case to the jury.243 In 1935,
240. See generally United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1975).
241. Paisley, supra note 12, at 1044.
242. Id.
243. See People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742 (1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1977); People v. Peete, 54 Cal. App. 333, 202 P. 51 (1921); Alternate Juror
Note, supra note 12, at 736 n.2.
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however, the substitution of an alternate for a regular juror after sev-
eral hours of deliberations was upheld on the basis of the California
Penal Code.244 Interestingly enough, in that same year People v. Brit-
ton 24 5 held that the California Penal Code, though allowing substitu-
tion after deliberations had commenced, did not authorize the
California Supreme Court to allow the alternate to be present, even
silently and with the defendant's consent, during the entire deliberation
process. 246 Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court, in the interest
of jury efficiency and effectiveness, eventually determined that the pres-
ence of an alternate juror in the jury room during the deliberations is
not necessarily detrimental to the defendant's constitutional right to
trial by jury and that defense counsel may stipulate to such a proce-
dure.24 7 While not expressly overruling Britton,24 People v. ValleS
249
presents California law as of 1979, holding that, as long as the alternate
juror is instructed that he is not to participate in the deliberations un-
less he is required by the court to replace one of the deliberating jurors,
his silent presence in the jury room is not a deprivation of the defend-
ant's right to trial by jury. However, if the instruction is disobeyed,
prejudice to the defendant will be presumed unless there is evidence to
the contrary. 250 Thus, California law exhibits a constitutional mod-
ernization of the alternate juror system, similar to that in Indiana,
which enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of this system.
25t
244. See People v. VonBadenthal, 8 Cal. App. 2d 404, 48 P.2d 82 (1935); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1089 (Deering) (1937); note 40 supra and accompanying text.
245. 4 Cal. 2d 622, 52 P.2d 217 (1935).
246. Id. See note 40 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Britton.
247. See People v. Valles, 24 Cal. 3d 121, 154 Cal. Rptr. 543, 593 P.2d 240 (1979).
248. The California Supreme Court felt that it need not expressly overrule People v. Britton, 4
Cal. 2d 622, 52 P.2d 217 (1935), because Britton did not present a case where counsel had stipu-
lated to the presence of the alternate juror in the deliberation room. Nevertheless, it should be
noted that the court in Britton adopted in full the holding of People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal. App. 2d
75, 40 P.2d 891 (1935), where such consent by counsel to the alternate's silent presence had been
obtained. Thus, it can effectively be argued that for all practical purposes Britton has been over-
ruled. See note 40 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Briton and Bruneman.
249. 24 Cal. 3d 121, 154 Cal. Rptr. 543, 593 P.2d 240 (1979).
250. Id at 122, 124, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 545, 547, 593 P.2d at 242, 244. Cf. United States v.
Allison, 481 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.), aft'd, 487 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982
(1974) (holding that sufficient prejudice for reversal will be shown only if the alternate in any way
participates in the jury deliberations).
251. The Indiana alternate juror system has experienced a similar developmental pattern. In
Rickard v. State, 74 Ind. 275 (1881), it was heldper se reversible error for a bailiff to be present
during the deliberation process because this constituted an invasion of the jury's privacy. In 1974,
however, Indiana Trial Rule 47 became effective, which provided that "[a]n alternate juror who
does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury brings in its verdict." IND. TR
47(B) (emphasis added). Thus, at any time during the trial or the deliberation process, the alter-
nate juror could take the place of a regular juror and function as fully as any other member of the
jury. Johnson v. State, 267 Ind. 256, 369 N.E.2d 623 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v.
Indiana, 436 U.S. 948 (1978). Realizing that the alternate substituted after deliberations had coin-
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The federal court system, even though exhibiting the time-honored
characteristic of resistance to change, has nevertheless also finally re-
sponded to the confusion and dissatisfaction expressed by the federal
courts over rules 23(b) and 24(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure.252 After almost two decades of inconsistent interpretations,
25 3
new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have been proposed and are
being circulated for comment.254 Proposed rule 23(b) retains the right
of stipulation by counsel for the government and the defense and the
defendant to a jury consisting of a lesser number than twelve. 255 How-
ever, should the court find it necessary to excuse a juror for just cause
after the deliberations have commenced, the new rule 23(b) provides
that the trial judge, in his discretion, may excuse that juror and submit
the case to the remaining eleven jurors, even over an objection to such
a procedure by the defendant.
256
The amendment to rule 24(c) 25 7 divides that rule into two sections.
The new rule 24(c) describes the selection of alternate jurors and pro-
vides that the trial judge, in his discretion, shall decide how many, if
any, alternate jurors should be retained after the jury retires to deliber-
ate and authorizes the trial judge to retain such alternates separate
from the deliberating jury.258 Rule 24(d) now defines the method of
substituting an alternate for a regular juror who has been found unable
or disqualified to perform his duties after the deliberations have com-
menced would be at a significant disadvantage, Indiana completed the evolutionary process by
allowing the silent alternate to observe the deliberations of the jury. Thus, the most effective
alternate juror system has been implemented in Indiana with this decision. See Johnson v. Duck-
worth, 650 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
252. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
253. See notes 49-98 supra and accompanying text.
254. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States
(Oct. 1981) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED FED. R. CRIM. P.].
255. See notes 23 & 51 supra and accompanying text.
256. The new Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b) provides:
(b) Jury of Less Than Twelve. Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the
parties may stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist
of any number less than 12 or that a valid verdict may be returned by a jury of less than
12 should the court find it necessary to excuse one or more jurors for any just cause after
trial commences. Even absent such stipulation, if the court finds it necessary to excuse a
juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the
court a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining 11jurors.
PROPOSED FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b). Compare PROPOSED FED. R. CIuM. P. 23(b) with FED. R.
CRIM. P. 23(b) at note 51 supra.
257. See note 52 supra.
258. Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c) provides, in part:
Alternate jurors shall not be present at the deliberations of the jury, but such number as the
court shall, in its discretion, decide to be necessary shall be retained and not discharged
while the jury is deliberating.
PROPOSED FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c).
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menced. In this instance, only an alternate juror who has been retained
pursuant to the new rule 24(c) can be substituted. After such a substi-
tution, the trial judge must instruct the entire jury to begin delibera-
tions anew. 259 The proponents of the two new rules have expressed a
preference for the rule 23(b) approach.
260
While the efforts of the drafters, at least in their recognition of the
need for revision, are commendable, the proposed rules still fall far
short of being the best available options. Proposed rule 23(b) is partic-
ularly distressing in that it will literally force a defendant to succumb to
a federal jury comprised of less than twelve members when the trial
judge deems this to be an available alternative. 26' Indeed, the constitu-
tionality of this rule can seriously be questioned under the considerable
precedent of the United States Supreme Court holding that trials to
twelve-member juries are constitutionally mandated in federal courts
and cannot be infringed upon by the legislature unless voluntarily
waived by the defendant with the consent of counsel.262 The problems
with the "isolation until substitution" procedure, the system that would
259. Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(d) provides:
(d) Replacing a Juror. Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace
jurors who become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties. After
the jury has retired to consider its verdict, a juror may be replaced only by an alternate juror
retained asprovided in subsection (c) ofthis rule, in which case the court shall instruct the
entire jury to commence their deliberations anew.
PROPOSED FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(d). Compare PROPOSED FED. R. CpIM. P. 24(c) and (d) with FED.
R. CRIM. P. 24(c) at note 52 supra.
260. PROPOSED FED. R. CRIM. P. 23 (Introductory Comment). Even though amendments to
both rules 23(b) and 24(c) are being circulated, only one of these amended rules realistically need
be implemented. If rule 23(b) is adopted, there would be no need to also adopt rules 24(c) and (d).
If a juror becomes ill or unable to continue after deliberations have commenced and the defendant
refuses to stipulate to a lesser-numbered jury than twelve, the trial judge may submit the case to
the remaining eleven jurors. Thus, rules 24(c) and (d) could be characterized as inconsistent. The
main problem to be resolved is which rule-23(b) or 24(c) and (d)--would take precedence. If
rules 24(c) and (d) were adopted, rule 23(b) appears to be unnecessary. In one situation, however,
both rules may be applicable at once. If alternate jurors are chosen and retained by the trial judge
in accordance with rule 24(c) and they are substituted until there are no remaining alternates in
accordance with rule 24(d), should a regular juror then become ill or unable to continue, rule
23(b) would allow the trial judge to submit the case to the remaining eleven jurors. It should be
noted, however, that the likelihood of this occurrence is small. It has also been proposed that the
defendant be given the option to elect between the two proposed rules at some point in time. If
both rules are viewed as advantageous, this could present a viable solution. However, problems
could arise in defining the appropriate point in time at which such an election should be made and
as to who should decide which option should be elected. Id.
261. See note 256 supra and accompanying text.
262. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 370 n.5 (1971) (Powell, J., concurring in
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 213 (1968); Patton
v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288-90 (1930); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900); Thomp-
son v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898). In Patton, it was expressly stated that the common law elements
of a jury trial are embedded in the provisions of the federal Constitution and must be adhered to
by the federal courts. One of these elements is that the "jury should consist of twelve men, neither
more nor less" and these elements "are beyond the authority of the legislative department to
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be implemented by the new rules 24(c) and (d),2 6 3 have already been
discussed; the shortcomings of this system need not be emphasized
again. 2
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While the effectiveness of the Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure is subject to sharp criticism, it is interesting to compare the
development of the federal alternate juror system with the similar de-
velopment of the California and Indiana systems.265 A careful exami-
nation of the evolutionary scheme taking place in the alternate juror
system reveals a three-stage process. The first stage of the process is the
absolute privacy of the jury deliberations. Consequently, a major fea-
ture of this stage is that substitution is only allowed up until the jury
retires to deliberate. 266 The second stage, the "isolation until substitu-
tion" procedure, is entered when the first stage proves to be ineffective
in accomplishing the desired result.267 Finally, the third stage, that in
which California and Indiana are present today, is adopted when the
jurisdiction realizes that in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness,
and with reasonable safeguards, an alternate can constitutionally be
permitted to observe silently the deliberation process. Thus, the federal
alternate juror system, even though subject to criticism, can be viewed
as simply entering the second stage of the evolutionary scheme. It is
evident that, with the federal courts already criticizing the procedure
proposed by the new rules 24(c) and (d),268 with at least one federal
court of appeals sanctioning the silent presence of the alternate juror in
the deliberation room, 269 and with the proponents of the new Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure at least considering the possibility of
"having the alternates remain with the jury from the very outset of the
deliberations," 270 the federal system will arguably reach the third stage
of this evolutionary process. Viewed in this perspective, the Proposed
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure27' would seem to support the al-
ternate juror system as it has developed in Indiana.
destroy or abridge." 281 U.S. at 288, 290. However, a defendant may voluntarily waive this
common-law right in federal courts. Id. at 312. See also notes 23 & 50 supra.
263. See notes 258-59 supra and accompanying text.
264. See notes 235-40 supra and accompanying text.
265. See notes 243-51 supra and accompanying text..
266. See note 243 supra and accompanying text.
267. See notes 235-46 & 251 supra and accompanying text.
268. See United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1975) (the court enumerated very
strong policy arguments against substitution of an alternate juror after commencement of deliber-
ations). See also notes 236-38 supra and accompanying text.
269. See United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.), afl'd, 487 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974).
270. PROPOSED FED. R. CRIM. P. 23 (Introductory Comment).
27 1. See notes 256 & 258-59 supra.
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Limitations of Alternatives Outside the Alternate Juror Realm
While the alternate juror procedure adopted by the Indiana courts
apparently presents the best possible solution to the incapacitation-of-
the-regular-juror dilemma, there are two procedures outside the alter-
nate juror realm which are also intended to aid in this situation. Un-
fortunately, these alternatives may be literally unavailable to either the
court or the defendant. Under the first procedure, the stipulation pro-
cess, a defendant may waive his right to a jury trial altogether or stipu-
late to a lesser-numbered jury than the jurisdiction requires. 272 This
procedure was initially announced in Patton v. United States,2 73 and
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 was promulgated subsequent to
and relying upon the Patton decision. 274 Consequently, the federal rule
provides that a defendant may stipulate to a jury numbered less than
twelve,2 75 even though twelve-member juries are constitutionally re-
quired in federal courts.276 Thus, if a regular juror becomes ill or un-
able to continue after deliberations have commenced, the defendant
can stipulate that the eleven remaining eligible jurors can render a
binding verdict. 277 However, this procedure may no longer be constitu-
tional today in those jurisdictions that provide for six-member juries.
Since Ballew v. Georgia,278 a jury consisting of less than six members is
constitutionally insufficient. Thus, it is uncertain whether a defendant
272. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). See also notes 23 & 50 supra and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Patton decision.
273. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
274. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23 (Practice Comment and Advisory Committee's Note-1946);
United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964).
275. See note 51 supra.
276. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (Powell, J., concurring in Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 414 (1972)); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276 (1930); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
277. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 332 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1964). See generally FED. R.
CRIM. P. 23(b) (Advisory Committee's Note-1946, 1977). Nevertheless, the holding in Patton
has been interpreted in some states to allow the defendant to stipulate to the alternate's silent
presence in the deliberation room. See People v. Valles, 24 Cal. 3d 121, 154 Cal. Rptr. 543, 593
P.2d 240 (1979). Additionally, even though the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure plainly pro-
vide for no such stipulation to the presence of an alternate juror during the deliberation process,
or for the substitution of an alternate for a regular juror after deliberations have commenced, see
notes 51 & 52 supra, some circuit courts have adopted this procedure, again on the authority of
Patton. See United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.), afd, 487 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974); Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d 313 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
385 U.S. 802 (1966),petition to vacate denied, 390 F.2d 634 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 953
(1968). No reason has been given for this adoption of the Patton criteria in the alternate juror
setting. Nevertheless, the apparent theory seems to be that, if a defendant can waive the constitu-
tional right to trial by jury of the statutorily required number of jurors, he can waive any other
right that goes to the essence of the jury deliberation process, such as the number of jurors in the
deliberation room and when the jurors can be substituted yet retaining the statutorily required
number of jurors. See also notes 58 & 66 supra and accompanying text.
278. 435 U.S. 223 (1978). See note 123 supra.
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in a state proceeding may stipulate to a lesser-numbered jury when the
jury consists of only six members to begin with.279 The second alterna-
tive is simply to declare a mistrial. The problems with this procedure
are inherent in the complexity and expense of the legal system itself
and could pose grave hardship for a defendant who has exhausted his
resources on one trial.280 Thus, as concluded by the Seventh Circuit,
while not perfect, the procedure adhered to by the Indiana courts may
truly present the best possible use of the alternate juror system.
28'
Finally, there is one factor, though never expressly discussed by
the Seventh Circuit, that was arguably a major consideration influenc-
ing their decision. This factor is money. That litigation is expensive is
a fact that cannot be disputed. Consequently, any constitutional proce-
dure that will reduce court and litigation time and expense should be
carefully analyzed and implemented. This does not advocate the in-
fringement of individual rights in the name of economy; rather, it em-
phasizes that when a constitutionally permissible procedure is
discovered that saves times and money and is effective, such as the In-
diana procedure at issue here, resistance to change should give way to
innovation and enhanced efficiency. 2
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A Potential Criticism of the Seventh Circuit Decision
The Indiana Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit, however,
may both be criticized as ignoring one crucial element in their approval
of the silent alternate juror procedure--the element of prejudice to the
defendant. 283 The most obvious explanation for the omission is simply
279. One might, nevertheless, argue that Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), would
still allow such a substitution. When Patton was decided in 1930, twelve-member juries were
constitutionally mandated in federal courts. See notes 20 & 262 supra and accompanying text.
Thus, the Patton decision allowed the defendant to stipulate to a trial with less than the constitu-
tionally required number ofjurors. 281 U.S. at 288-90. However, in 1930, there was no constitu-
tionally insufficient number of jurors. It was in 1979, in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979),
that the United States Supreme Court determined that a five-member jury was unconstitutional.
Thus, it is unclear whether a defendant may stipulate to a constitutionally insufficient jury of five
when the jury has only six members to begin with. See also Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122,
126 n.10 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
280. 650 F.2d at 126. The court, the attorneys, the witnesses and the jurors are also put in an
uncomfortable position if a mistrial is deemed necessary. The judge may have to relinquish the
case after much research, counsel may be discharged after much time and effort because of lack of
funds for continued employment, witnesses will be forced to appear in court once again and the
jurors may feel that their time was completely wasted, thus resulting in a poor impression of the
legal system itself. Id.
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1980); People v. Valles, 24 Cal. 3d
121, 154 Cal. Rptr. 543, 593 P.2d 240 (1979); State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 220 S.E.2d 521 (1975)
(Huskins, J., dissenting).
283. See Johnson v. State, 267 Ind. 256, 369 N.E.2d 623 (1977), cer. deniedsub nom. Johnson
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that it was not at issue on appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court or to
the federal courts. While Johnson objected in the trial court to the al-
ternate's presence in the deliberation room, he never requested a hear-
ing subsequent to verdict to determine any possible prejudice. 284
Consequently, no hearing was conducted to see whether there was any
juror misconduct or participation by the silent alternate. 285 In the ab-
sence of evidence of misconduct or participation by the silent alternate
juror, no prejudice should be presumed by the court.
28 6
There may, nevertheless, be other reasons why the prejudice ele-
ment was not mentioned. In order to determine whether the defendant
was "prejudiced," the court must be able to define "prejudice" in the
context of the alternate juror procedure. The definition of prejudice in
the conventional sense refers to a forejudgment, bias, or preconceived
notion-a leaning towards one side of a cause for some reason other
than a conviction of its justice.287 The Tenth Circuit, in United States v.
Beasley,288 concluded that, in the alternate juror context, "it is difficult
to see how a test of 'prejudice' can be applied. ' 289 The silent alternate
juror is as equally qualified as the regular jurors; thus, it is difficult to
see how his or her presence can be considered "prejudicial. ' 2
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Most jurisdictions that purport to account for prejudice simply
provide that if the observant alternate did or said anything to influence
the deliberating jury, or expressed an opinion or conclusion, that this
will be seen as prejudicial enough to mandate reversal.29' But, again,
this is not really related to "prejudice." Such acts would more appro-
priately be labeled attempts to influence the deliberating jury or to in-
vade their deliberations. Such participation could then be attacked on
the theory that there were more than the legislatively required number
of jurors actively participating in the actual deliberation process. Thus,
the use of a "prejudice" standard, at least in its conventional defini-
tion,292 is arguably an inappropriate standard by which to measure a
silent alternate juror's impact upon a deliberating jury.
v. Indiana, 436 U.S. 948 (1978). The Indiana Supreme Court never discussed the issue of
prejudice and Justice Pivarnik, dissenting, emphasized this as a major flaw in the majority's deci-
sion. Id. at 260, 369 N.E.2d at 625 (Pivarnik, J., dissenting).
284. See notes 145-46 supra and note 300 infra and accompanying text.
285. See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text.
286. See notes 222-23 supra and accompanying text.
287. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (5th ed. 1979).
288. 464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972). See notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text.
289. 464 F.2d at 470.
290. Id.
291. See, e.g., United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.), aft'd, 487 F.2d 339 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974); United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972).
292. See note 287 supra and accompanying text.
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Assuming prejudice could be satisfactorily defined in the alternate
juror context, the next problem concerns how to determine whether
there was such prejudicial participation. Opponents of the prejudice
standard argue that a hearing to determine whether the alternate's pres-
ence prejudiced the deliberating jury would be impractical, inadequate,
and a dangerous intrusion into the proceedings of the jury. 2 9 3 On the
other hand, the justices who think prejudice should be taken into ac-
count also argue that an evidentiary hearing to determine prejudice
would, in and of itself, be a dangerous intrusion into the jury delibera-
tion process. 294 The result would seem to be that an evidentiary hear-
ing should be limited to determining only whether the silent alternate
juror said or did anything that the deliberating jury noticed or was
aware of. But the mere fact that an alternate made a gesture or uttered
an innocuous statement should surely not rise to the level of
"prejudice" sufficient to require a mistrial.295
Finally, even if Indiana did grant such a hearing to determine any
possible "prejudice," there is a question of how much information the
jurors would be required to reveal of the deliberation process. In
Turczi v. State,296 the Indiana Supreme Court determined that an alter-
nate, just as a regular juror, may not, by affidavit, impeach the verdict
of the jury. 2 97 In holding that the sanctity of verdicts would be dimin-
ished, that no verdict would ever be final and that jurypersons would
forever be harassed, the court imposed this rule upon alternates as well
as regular jurors. However, the impact of Turczi upon the silent alter-
nate juror procedure can be viewed as dichotomous. If a hearing to
determine prejudice attempted to reveal the substance of the delibera-
tions, Turczi would preclude such a hearing. On the other hand, if an
evidentiary hearing was simply limited to the determination of whether
the alternate said or did anything, the Turczi decision would not seem
to preclude this type of hearing.298 Even so, the mere fact that an alter-
nate said or did anything, as pointed out previously, need not result in
293. See United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Beasley,
464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972).
294. See Johnson v. State, 267 Ind. 256, 369 N.E.2d 623 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson
v. Indiana, 436 U.S. 948 (1978) (Pivarnik, J., dissenting).
295. See La-Tex Supply Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Div., Fruehauf Corp., 444 F.2d 1366 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971). See also note 97 supra for a discussion of the facts in La-
Tex.
296. 261 Ind. 273, 301 N.E.2d 752 (1973).
297. Id at 275, 301 N.E.2d at 753.
298. In fact, Indiana does allow hearings where there is evidence of misconduct or communi-
cations between the bailiff and the jury. See Sparks v. State, 154 Ind. App. 691, 290 N.E.2d 793
(1972). It should be pointed out, however, that this type of communication is expressly prohibited
by statute. See note 149 supra.
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a "prejudiceper se"299 standard such that a mistrial must be declared.
In any event, because there was no evidence that the silent alternate
juror had any impact upon the deliberating jury, no "prejudice" was
presumed by the Seventh Circuit.
3°°
Future Considerations
The Seventh Circuit's holding expands the boundaries of the tradi-
tional alternate juror system. 301 If kept within the requirements set
down by the Indiana courts, the system will enhance the efficiency of
the entire trial system by eliminating numerous mistrials with the in-
herent benefit of decreasing the time and expense involved in all types
of litigation.30 2 Nevertheless, there are still problems with the proposed
299. A "prejudice per se" standard would conclude that prejudice can be inferred from the
mere fact that an alternate said or did anything. See note 76 supra.
300. In terms of the possible effects that a silent alternate juror may have on the deliberation
process, it is interesting to note the results of a recent study conducted at the University of Califor-
nia. See Bridgeman & Marlowe, Jury Decision Making. An Empirical Study Based on Actual
Felony Trials, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 91 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bridgeman & Marlowe]. This
study is heralded by its authors as the first of its kind to study what actually transpires in the jury
room deliberations. One previous effort by another author to record surreptitiously actual deliber-
ations provoked such an indignant reaction by the courts that no further attempts have been made
to conduct such a study. This study was conducted as an interview after ten criminal trials in
California had been completed; the response in and of itself may indicate the seriousness with
which the jurors take their responsibilities. Despite the support of the county district attorney, the
offer of a moderate sum of money to participate in the interview, one follow-up letter and two
phone calls to the reluctant jurors, the authors were never able to secure the cooperation of more
than seven jurors from any one trial. Id. at 92. The questions asked of the jurors dealt largely
with the actual deliberations and rather surprising results were discovered: (I) the majority of
jurors, once having voted on the first ballot, did not change their vote; (2) the jury deliberations
themselves did not appear to be a significant factor in forming juror opinion or in determining
final voting behavior; rather, these deliberations were often viewed as justifications for the verdicts
the jurors had already formed; and (3) the large majority ofjurors had made up their mind as to a
verdict before the deliberation process began. Most jurors justify their final verdict largely on the
basis of what occurs during the course of the trial. Id. at 94-96. Accord United States v. Young,
301 F.2d 298, 299 (6th Cir. 1962). It was found that jurors relied primarily on the evidence and
did not appear to be influenced by subtle sociopersonal considerations. It seemed rather likely
that real jurors did succeed in ignoring extraneous and subtle features of the trial process. Bridg-
eman & Marlowe at 98. Accord H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 488-91 (1971).
These results could suggest that the presence or absence of an alternate juror during the delibera-
tion process would have little or no impact on the deliberations or the final verdict of the individ-
ual jury members.
301. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
302. The silent alternate juror procedure has already been used in at least one civil case. See
La-Tex Supply Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Div., Fruehauf Corp., 444 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971). See also note 97 supra for a discussion of La-Tex. Cf. Vander Veer v.
Toyota Motor Distrib., 282 Or. 135, 577 P.2d 1343 (1978) (relying on an Oregon statute requiring
dismissal of the alternate when the jury retires to deliberate, the Oregon Supreme Court found
reversible error when two alternates accompanied the regular jurors to the jury room; however, it
should be noted that, in this civil case, the alternates had participated in the vote on the issue of
liability).
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procedure which will require careful consideration by courts in the
future.
The first of these problems concerns who should decide when, and
if, an alternate juror should accompany the regular jury to the jury
room for silent observation. The ideal solution to this problem, the
solution adopted in Indiana, is to place the decision solel5 within the
discretion of the trial judge.30 3 This practice will eliminate the contro-
versy that has arisen in some courts as to whether the defendant must
personally consent to the alternate's silent presence. 3°4 Furthermore,
there will be no infringement upon the defendant's right to trial by jury
because the defendant is still being tried by the legislatively required
number of jurors; the procedure merely decreases the possibility of a
mistrial. This solution also obviates consent by counsel. While counsel
for the government should have little objection to the silent alternate's
presence, 30 5 it is apparent from the objections raised to the procedure
that defense counsel obviously feel a tactical advantage will be gained
by the necessity of a new trial, not the least of which has been the expo-
sure of the prosecution's case.3° 6 While the defense counsel's motives
in attempting to provide the client with the best possible defense
certainy cannot be faulted, such motives should not outweigh the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial with a legislatively determined jury size
and the state's interest in providing the defendant with such a trial eco-
nomically. Consequently, placing the decision solely within the trial
303. Placing the decision solely within the discretion of the trial judge in the silent alternate
juror context should not be likened to the procedure suggested by Proposed Federal Rule of Crim-
inal Procedure 23(b), see notes 256 & 261-62 supra and accompanying text. The ultimate effect of
proposed rule 23(b) would force a defendant to succumb to a lesser-numbered jury than that
constitutionally mandated in the federal courts if the trial judge deemed this to be an available
option. In the alternate juror situation, however, allowing the trial judge, in his discretion, to send
an alternate to silently observe the deliberation process ensures that the defendant will be tried by
the legislatively preferred number of jurors and reduces the likelihood that the defendant will
have to undergo another trial if one of the regular jurors cannot complete the deliberation process.
304. See United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.), q 'd, 487 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974); Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d 313 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
385 U.S. 802 (1966),petition to vacate denied, 390 F.2d 634 (9th Cir.), ceri. denied, 391 U.S. 953
(1968); United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964); People v. Britton, 4
Cal. 2d 622, 52 P.2d 217 (1935).
305. This statement is based upon the assumption that counsel for the government has ex-
pended its best efforts in the trial at hand and has a sincere interest in the expedient resolution of
all cases it presents in terms of fairness, time and expense.
306. Other defense counsel considerations in favor of a new trial include such things as: the
longer the postponement of trial, evidence becomes stale; witnesses' memories are not as clear; any
bad publicity may have subsided; the prosecutor may be more willing to plea bargain; the defend-
ant is presumably out on bail longer, a new trial presents an opportunity to correct any errors
made in the first trial.
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judge's discretion is the most reasonable and objective method
available.
Even if the decision to send an alternate into the jury room to
silently observe the deliberations is made solely at the trial judge's dis-
cretion, there is still the problem of when this procedure should be fol-
lowed. This decision should also be left to the trial judge's sound
discretion; however, a common sense standard should obviously pre-
vail and the judge's discretion must be carefully exercised. If it is ap-
parent to the judge, on the basis of experience and the nature of the
case, that the jury should arrive at a verdict relatively early in the delib-
eration process, then the judge may decide that no silent alternate
should be present. However, even if the nature of the case suggests an
early verdict, the judge may still determine that an alternate should be
present based on the composition of the regular jury itself.30 7 In all
situations, however, the trial judge's discretion should be respected and
the decision to send in an alternate who is not needed or the failure to
send in an alternate who was needed, with a resulting mistrial, should
not result in criticism of the judge's exercise of discretion.
In considering which alternate juror should accompany the regular
jury to the jury room, judicial discretion is unnecessary. There are two
completely objective means of choosing the silent alternate and both
should be considered acceptable by the court, the defendant and coun-
sel. The first method would allow the first alternate chosen during the
voir dire examination to accompany the jury. The second procedure is
simply to choose by lot from the alternates available at the completion
of the trial.
Even after the process of selection, instruction and retirement to
the jury room of the silent alternate has been successfuly completed,
courts may still find themselves in a very difficult situation if the de-
fendant claims that he was "prejudiced" by the silent alternate's pres-
ence. One form of "prejudice" that may be claimed is that the physical
manifestations of the alternate may influence the deliberating jury.
30 8
If this notion persists-that facial expressions and subtle gestures may
have the effect of influencing or inhibiting the deliberating jurors--the
obvious solution is simply to isolate the alternate in an area where he
can hear the deliberations but cannot see, or be seen by, the deliberat-
ing jurors. The purpose of his presence in the jury room is only to hear
307. Rather extreme examples of situations when a judge may think it wise to send in a silent
alternate on a relatively simple or clearcut case would be when a regular juror is nine months'
pregnant or very old.
308. See notes 219-23 supra and accompanying text.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
what has previously transpired so that he will not be ignorant of the
discussions if he is required to replace one of the deliberating jurors.
There is no corresponding requirement that he also be able to see the
individuals making certain statements. Further, no elaborate changes
of the jury room need occur to effectuate this separation. The only
alteration required is the erection of a portable panel between the de-
liberating jurors and the alternate.
Finally, the "prejudice" standard has yet to be adequately defined
in the silent alternate juror context and the complete disregard of
"prejudice" by the Indiana Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals may suggest either that there is no adequate defini-
tion or that there simply is no prejudice.309 It is arguable that there is
no "prejudice" in the conventional sense of the term; had the silent
alternate been "prejudiced," he would have been eliminated through
voir dire.310 Thus, "prejudice" should perhaps be eliminated as a crite-
rion in determining whether reversal is required or not.
It is possible that purely a semantic change would eliminate this
definitional problem. A better standard would perhaps ask whether the
deliberating jury was "influenced" by the silent alternate in any man-
ner. However, even this standard would be subject to criticism because
the courts are ambiguous as to what actions of a silent alternate juror
would be regarded as "attempts to influence" the deliberating jury.
Subtle gestures and innocuous statements surely should not rise to the
level of "influence" such that reversal would be required.3" Yet, a
more detailed attempt to determine the silent alternate's influence upon
the deliberating jury may be considered a dangerous intrusion into the
privacy of the jury deliberations. 312 Consequently, in the absence of
any evidence of juror misconduct or participation by the alternate, no
influence on the deliberations of the jury by the silent alternate's pres-
ence should be presumed by the court.
CONCLUSION
In Johnson v. Duckworth, the Seventh Circuit was required to de-
termine the constitutionality of an Indiana trial court procedure that
allowed an alternate juror to silently observe the jury deliberation pro-
cess. This procedure was followed in order to prevent a mistrial if one
309. See notes 283-300 supra and accompanying text.
310. See note 287 supra and accompanying text for the definition of "prejudice."
311. See La-Tex Supply Co. v. Freuhauf Trailer Div., Fruehauf Corp., 444 F.2d 1366 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971). See also note 97 supra for a discussion of La-Tex.
312. See notes 293-95 supra and accompanying text.
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of the regular jurors became ill or unable to continue after delibera-
tions had commenced. This specific procedure was implemented to en-
sure that the substituted juror would be fully apprised of the previous
deliberations and, thus, would be voting after a thorough examination
of the case. In upholding the Indiana trial court procedure, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the silent presence of an alternate juror during
the deliberation process does not violate a defendant's constitutional
right to trial by jury. In so holding, the court examined the particular
type of encroachment upon the privacy of the jury deliberation process
and concluded that the silent alternate's presence was not the type of
invasion that would impair the purpose of the jury trial or inhibit the
jury's ability to debate.
The Seventh Circuit's holding in this case required two underlying
decisions. First, that state and federal jury practice need not be in con-
formity, and second, that the right to jury privacy does not require ab-
solute privacy. Once the independence of state and federal jury
practice was acknowledged, the court was required to determine the
degree of privacy that was constitutionally mandated. While the jury is
protected against the intrusion of outsiders into the privacy of their de-
liberations, the silent alternate was not found to be the typical outsider
from which the jury might need insulation. The alternate had been
subjected to the same selection process and had been exposed to the
same evidence. Consequently, the silent alternate was not found to be
an outsider from which the jury needed protection and was not such an
intrusion into the privacy of the deliberation process that the jury's
ability to debate freely would be hampered.
While the procedure utilized by the Indiana trial court was clearly
constitutional, the most persuasive reasons behind the Seventh Circuit's
opinion were the policy considerations underlying its decision. Finding
that the alternate juror procedures in the majority of jurisdictions were
inadequate to accomplish the purpose of preventing the multitude of
mistrials experienced when regular jurors became ill after deliberations
had commenced, the court determined that the Indiana procedure was,
in fact, perhaps the most effective procedure available. The system em-
ployed by the Indiana trial court enabled Indiana to maintain a more
efficient trial system and this alternate juror procedure truly utilized
alternate jurors to their fullest potential.
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